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ABSTRACT
Smartphones and Somatizing
by
Jonathan Berkowitz

Advisor: Lissa Weinstein, Ph.D.
This project explores the relationship between smartphone use, somatizing, and mentalized
affectivity. The sample consisted of 511 iPhone users who completed an online survey that
included scales measuring somatizing, mentalized affectivity, and general symptoms, as well as
measures of smartphone engagement and addiction. Participants also provided data from their
screentime application, and information about game-playing tendencies. A series of regression
models were used to analyze data.
Results showed that smartphone addiction and game playing predicted somatizing, and did
not interact with mentalized affectivity. Game-players somatized more than non-game players,
and within the game-playing subgroup, those who reported spending more time playing
somatized more. Mentalized affectivity interacted with messaging motivations: For individuals
low in processing affect, texting to escape feelings was negatively associated with somatizing;
for those high in processing affect, texting to escape was positively associated with somatizing.
Somatizing and depression and anxiety symptoms were highly correlated, and illuminated the
difficulty in distinguishing between different underlying psychical processes associated with
similar scores on instruments used in this study. Smartphone use was found to be a complex
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construct, as motivations behind objective measures remained cloaked. Clinical implications,
theoretical nuances, and directions for future research are also discussed.
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Chapter 1: Introduction

Smartphones have drastically changed the way we live. They facilitate digital interaction
in novel ways, and their advent has been arguably as significant as the introduction of the
original telephone. Smartphones have enabled face-to-face interaction and data exchange in
record time and quantity, and with the immediacy and convenience of text-based
communication, new ways of using language have emerged (Choudhury, et al, 2007).
Smartphones bring the internet to people’s pockets, allowing for reliable access and interpersonal
connectivity. Meetup apps create communities built around an enormous array of shared
interests, bringing people together in ways that would have previously been difficult, if not
impossible. Dating apps have increased access and expanded the range of possibilities for
individuals to choose potential partners based on their chosen criteria faster and more efficiently
than before. Smartphones are relied upon for language translation in foreign countries and for
providing maps and directions, increasing travelers’ safety, confidence, and comfort. They are
used to document and share important moments with family and friends, and their use has
contributed to the empowerment of oppressed individuals, by making public abuse and injustice.
Students have gained immediate access to educational materials and tutorials, and can interact
with teachers and peers in ways that streamline learning. For increasingly many people,
smartphones have become the primary medium for accessing teletherapy, critical in instances
where traditional in-person psychotherapy is inconvenient or impossible. The myriad platforms
and capabilities made possible by smartphones have no doubt expanded and improved quality of
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life for many, and have contributed to a more general sense of interpersonal connectedness and
availability.
This study, however, explores a potential downside to smartphone use. Here we make a
theoretical case linking certain types of smartphone-use tendencies to somatizing, and explore
how for some, engaging with smartphones may be associated with detrimental outcomes.
The shift away from in-person interaction and quiet reflection to the medium of
smartphones signifies a more general transition to a world replete with digital images, texting
and games, and immediacy - one characterized by the reduction of elaborated language. Adorno
(1983) has argued that overexposure to stock images depletes peoples’ inner life. Specific,
descriptive verbal interaction has been commandeered by “likes” on Facebook and emojis in text
messages, leaving individuals with scant communication and yet – paradoxically – with the
illusion of deep interpersonal connectedness. Turkle (2011, 2015) has expounded on this trend
in her recent books, in which she links society’s pervasive reliance on devices to measurable
decreases in our capacity for empathy, and our growing incapacity to be alone. Undivided
attention has become a rare commodity, something even to be feared and avoided. Simple
observation on a walk in the city or on a subway ride illuminates just how fleeting quiet alone
time has become, as a significant number of adults can be found with a smartphone in hand.
Society has begun to intuit and take note of the detrimental effects borne by the pervasiveness of
smartphones. Excessive smartphone use has become a noted social issue (Lin, et al., 2015), and
has been linked to anxiety, increased dependence on smartphones, and reduced appreciation of
and awareness of nature and wildlife (Richardson et al., 2018). Smartphone addiction is an
increasing problem, and has been linked to sleep disturbance, depression (Thomee et al., 2011),
withdrawal, stress (Visnjic et al., 2018), and greater consumption of alcohol and tobacco (De-
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Sola, et al., 2016). The aim of this study is to explore the relationship between smartphone use
and somatizing – the tendency to experience and report bodily pain and discomfort in response to
interpersonal or intrapsychic stress (Lipowski, 1988).
Previous studies have explored the effects of exposure to electromagnetic fields (EMF)
associated with smartphones, and ergonomic effects (SSM, 2009; Gustafsson, et al., 2010, as
cited in Thomee et al., 2011); I recognize the likelihood of a complex interaction of different
factors that result in physical symptoms, as well as the potential bidirectionality of the
relationship between somatizing and smartphone use. Psychoanalytic theory offers the potential
for a novel conceptualization of the impact of smartphone use. Central to this
reconceptualization are the ideas of four interrelated theorists, each of whom address, in their
own way, the relationship between language and the capacity for representation of affective
states, and the impact of forces that impede the symbolizing process. The theoretical
underpinning of this study is based mainly on Freudian and Bionian ideas, integrated with the
work of Rapaport and Loewald. This study also incorporates the construct of mentalized
affectivity - the process of making sense of emotions in light of one’s autobiographical memory
and history (Jurist, 2005; 2017; 2018) - in its investigation, with the goal of determining if
individuals’ capacity to identify, modulate, and communicate about emotions affects the
proposed relationship between smartphone use and somatizing.
My interest in studying smartphone use, somatizing, and mentalized affectivity was
sparked while working with a long-term psychotherapy patient named James 1. James came to
treatment because he suffered from various somatic symptoms; it wasn’t until his GI doctor
suggested he pursue psychotherapy that he made his way to our clinic. James was born in the

1
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1990s, and stated that his family always used mobile phones. He received a smartphone in
middle school; smartphones were the primary mode of communication between his family
members. During our year-long treatment, James discussed countless interactions with family
and friends – most of which seemed to be conducted over text. He was extremely connected to
his phone, and actively avoided having in-person conversations, especially if there was potential
for conflict. In the therapy room, James would ritually begin each session by charging his phone
and setting it down where it would be in view. When discussing times of conflict in his romantic
relationships, James would unconsciously retreat to his phone, unceasingly fiddling with it
during sessions. This behavior mirrored James’ tendency to use his smartphone to avoid tense
interaction. At such times of relationship duress, we noticed that his somatic symptoms would
become exacerbated. Further, apart from feeling like it was “easier” to interact with his
girlfriend via text, James could not articulate a difference between in-person (IRL – “in real
life”) interaction and text-based interaction; to him, there seemed to be no qualitative difference.
On many occasions, James reread text-message conversations to me directly from his
smartphone, adding his own inflection to the text of those with whom he was communicating.
When emulating his friends’ and family members’ tone in conversations, I realized James was
projecting his own feelings onto the text conversation, and it seemed hard for him to see others
as having feelings distinct from those he projected. James had difficulty recognizing that the
inflection he attributed to his friends and family members originated within himself, and there
was little room in the treatment for us to play with other possible understandings or intentions of
their texts. Further, the texts themselves were sparse, and seemed lacking in verbosity and depth.
James’ reliance on smartphones is not unique. This year, over six billion people will use
smartphones (Panda & Jain, 2018). Problematic smartphone use has increased to the extent that
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some have suggested a designation in the DSM-5 for smartphone addiction (Lin, et al., 2016). In
2018, the 11th revision of the International Classification of Diseases (ICD-11)2 included
“Gaming Disorder” – an addictive behavior characterized by a pattern of persistent or recurrent
gaming behavior, online or offline – for the first time, recognizing the increasing trend of
problematic gaming. As smartphones continue to embed themselves in our lives, it will be
increasingly important to understand the effects of their use on health. When discussing the
effects of smartphones and technology use on society, Turkle writes that the ubiquity of
smartphones has moved us in a direction away from conversation. She discusses the trend to
text, and that many people rely on the curated, non-spontaneous nature of text to avoid
potentially affectively intense interactions. She also explains that devices distract individuals
from looking deeper into themselves in moments of anxiety. In considering these ideas, I
immediately thought of James – an archetype of these very problems – who has allowed his
phone to become a distractor of which Turkle speaks. Turkle’s discussion of the evolution of
conversation seems to be harking back to Rapaport’s (1944) insight about prerequisites for
conversation, which includes the understanding that there must be a “mood of confidence” (p.
201) in which individuals cannot fear that in communicating they will lose the other’s
acceptance. Rapaport states: “Let’s suppose a person is proud. When you have a conversation
with that person, at what moment will he be ready to discuss matters which may cut into his
pride? Only when he knows that he has at least as good a defense in you of what he defends
with his pride as he has in himself. Thus, if you can demonstrate such basic premises which
guarantee to the other person that you will not reject him, then he can give up his own defending
of himself and as a consequence the field of conversation enlarges” (p. 201). Communication

2
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comprised solely of text is inherently ambiguous, as it does not include information about affect
and intent that is transmitted by facial cues. Rapaport’s criteria for acceptance are difficult to
establish in this limited medium. We are slowly recognizing a growing societal crutch wherein
relationships are increasingly limited to digital media, and individuals remain defended against
creating circumstances that might facilitate the expansion of the field of conversation.
In pursuing this study, I hope to gain a deeper understanding of how smartphone use and
somatizing are linked, and the role of mentalized affectivity in that relationship. The ubiquity of
smartphones and their pervasiveness in almost every facet of human life makes the smartphone
an especially good object for psychoanalytic inquiry and thinking.
The psychoanalytic ideas which motivate this study can be described with three broad,
but overlapping, bodies of work: Firstly, Freud’s writing on the preconscious, as described in his
1915 work, The Unconscious, and as extended in the work of I. Matte Blanco and A. Green.
Secondly, we can apply Loewald’s ideas about types of cathexis, the role and value of language,
and their linking primary and secondary process. Thirdly, and equally illuminating, is
Rapaport’s derivation of a theory of thinking, in which consciousness is linked to cathexis beginning with the drives - and also Rapaport’s ideas about ego autonomy. Each of these bodies
of work offer valuable and increasingly encompassing ways of conceptualizing aspects of a
theoretical link between smartphone use and somatizing, and will be touched upon briefly in this
introduction – followed by deeper explication below. Also adding to the discussion, the second
chapter will include an analysis of the topic from a Bionian perspective, in which I hope to
redefine the smartphone as the “(un)container” for individuals who use it to defend in this way.
In his writing on the unconscious, Freud (1915) describes 'preconscious' as a pathway
between systems Ucs. and Cs. – the unconscious and conscious – that operate under
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fundamentally different rules. Freud (1900; 1915), Matte Blanco (1975; 1988), and Green
(1974) argue that (a) content from the system Ucs. must be altered if it is to emerge in the system
Cs., and (b) the preconscious (or system Pcs., per Freud) serves that function or process: The
system Pcs. mediates the resolution of unconscious conflict by allowing for the reintegration of
thought and affect. It represents the overlap of different ways of being: Of conscious and
unconscious, of internal and external; of fantasy and reality. In this way, the system Pcs. is
analogous to the Winnicottian notion of transitional or potential space that therapists seek to
cultivate in the therapy room. Excessive smartphone use can interfere with the preconscious link
between the systems Ucs. and Cs., effectively stymieing the resolution of conflict and shrinking
preconscious space, increasing repressive pressure, which can emerge in the form of somatic
symptoms.
Loewald (1980) underscores the role of language in the interaction between primary and
secondary process, whereby higher levels of mental organization are achieved by linking thing–
and word– representations. The introduction of language creates a new reality; categorization in
which things become associated with words represents a perceptual experience involving a
“transformation of primary-process aspects of language into secondary-process organization”
(p.180). Loewald incorporates Freud’s (1915) notion of hypercathexis in his explication of the
role of language, locating important linking processes in the preconscious – in fact, he describes
such activity as a “preconscious mental act” (p.188). Interaction via smartphone, as described
above, minimizes elaboration with language, and can attenuate the transformation of primary
into secondary process. People are talking less 3, receiving less facial feedback from others, and

3
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use language more primitively 4. Unconscious conflict remains unprocessed, and is felt in the
body.
Broadly, Rapaport (1951) introduces a theory of ego autonomy, and derives a theory of
thinking rooted in drive theory. With regards to ego autonomy, Rapaport paints a picture of the
ego’s relative autonomy from external and internal (drive) forces, emphasizing that autonomy
from without is guaranteed by appropriate internal, id, forces, and autonomy from within is
maintained by appropriate external stimuli. Analogous to the example Rapaport brings from
Orwell’s Nineteen Eighty-Four (p. 730), constant smartphone use hampers the ego’s autonomy
from the environment by disconnecting individuals from the drives. His theory of thinking
explains how drive cathexes propel ideas into consciousness, and, akin to Loewald’s thinking,
that language fixes content and makes a hierarchical organization. Rapaport describes
preconscious ideas as those which are neither countercathected nor hypercathected, and states
that defenses are generalized systems of countercathectic energy, which can ultimately alter
drives, producing drive derivatives. At best, individuals’ use of energy in defense via the
smartphone can disrupt the autonomy of drive distributions, and – at worst – alter the drive
derivatives, or create new systems entirely. Repression of intrapsychic conflict associated with
impedance of drive discharge can have a narrowing quality, maintaining equilibrium by
excluding memories and relationships; the smartphone can act as a facilitator of this process –
and in extreme cases, can take over and foreclose any potential for elaboration, symbolization, or
the recontextualization of intrapsychic conflict with novel narratives, binding cathectic energies.
For some, the smartphone, in its availability and provision of immediacy, has become an
autonomous entity in the service of repression.

4
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In the next chapter, each of these systems of thought are discussed in greater detail. I
predict that mentalized affectivity will moderate the relationship between smartphone use and
somatizing symptoms. Loewald (1980) writes, “Developed language is a vehicle for articulating
complex experiences or thought processes, for making explicit their elements and the mutual
connections between these elements, for ‘scanning’ experience and thought point by point, thus
rendering their immanent textured structure” (p. 196). Loewald’s statement’s characteristically
introspective implication resonates with the importance of language for processing of affect –
particularly in efforts to elevate one’s experience to a more complex and sophisticated state.
Mentalized affectivity invokes the overlap between thinking and feeling and, in a way that
summons two disparate ways of being, is intrinsically connected to preconscious thinking. The
capacity to both tolerate and to play creatively with affect is connected to preconscious activity
and potential space. Just as therapists seek to cultivate a playful, transitional space in treatment,
Jurist (2018) suggests that therapists also seek to facilitate their patients’ ability to mentalize.
For unconscious, symmetric process – Matte Blanco’s generalized explicatory term for
primary process mentation (discussed below) - to be captured in representation, a buffer is
needed. That buffer was introduced by Freud as the system Pcs. What cannot be bound in
representation, returns to and emerges from the body in the form of somatic symptoms. This
study uses these ideas to make sense of the relationship between how individuals use their
smartphones, the likelihood individuals are to somatize, and the role of mentalized affectivity as
a potential moderator of the relationship.

9
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Chapter 2: Literature Review and Theoretical Argument

Somatizing
Among other characteristics, the DSM-5 (American Psychiatric Association, 2013)
describes somatic symptom and related disorders as those with medically unexplained
symptoms, and accounts for such symptoms by suggesting that certain psychiatric diagnoses first
manifest somatically. In the absence of explanatory medical diagnoses, offering psychiatric
diagnoses to explain physical symptoms provides a method of characterization and organization
more than etiological clarity. Such ailments are often classified as functional somatic
syndromes, a title that is often more descriptive of patients’ experiences by validating the ways in
which they are effected in real, physical ways (Stone et al, 2003). What we consider somatic,
mind-body phenomena, have been a subject of exploration and conjecture since at least the
ancient Egyptians and Greeks; in both histories, there exist records of attempting to link
hysterical symptoms to physical, structural issues. (Tasca, Rapetti, Carta, & Fadda, 2012).
Psychoanalytic thinkers, beginning with Freud, have written at length about
psychosomatic phenomena. Freud (1895) introduced the notion that hysterical symptoms are
psychogenic in nature, rooted in unconscious conflict. Franz Alexander, a student of Freud,
widely considered the father of psychosomatic medicine, commented on physicians’ tendencies
to explain pathology with simple, structural cause-effect explanations, but suggested that “more
clinicians realize that even in physiologically understood illnesses only the last links in the causal
chain are known and the primary etiological factors remain in darkness” (Alexander, 1950, p.
22). Influenced by psychoanalysis, Alexander presented an integrated mind-body theory, in
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which personality could “be defined as the expression of the unity of the organism” (p. 34),
incorporating the gestalt notion that understanding discrete physiological phenomena does not
translate to a complete understanding of the systems they serve.
As years have passed, these systems remain complex and physiologically obscure, and
psychosomatic disorders are growing increasingly prevalent (Riebel, Egloff, Witthoft, 2012;
Hanel et al., 2009; Servan-Schreiber et al., 2000). Such symptom clusters represent the majority
of complaints seen in primary care and according to Barsky and colleagues (2005) cost the
healthcare system an estimated $256 billion yearly, with somatizing patients contributing to
twice the medical costs of non-somatizing patients (McDaniel, Doherty, & Hepworth, 2014).
These disorders include chronic pain syndromes, fibromyalgia, carpal tunnel syndrome,
gastrointestinal syndromes, tension and migraine headaches, genitourinary syndromes, tinnitus,
vertigo, allergic phenomena, eczema and other skin problems, and chronic fatigue (ServanSchreiber et al., 2000; Sarno, 2006). They have been shown to be associated with psychiatric
and psychosocial disorders, personality disorders, and especially depressive and anxiety
disorders (Johnson, 2008; Servan-Schreiber et al., 2000). The DSM-5 (APA, 2013) estimates the
prevalence of somatic symptom disorder in the general adult population to be 5-7%, with higher
rates in females than males. Predictors of persistence of somatizing disorders include female
sex, poor self-rated health, history of trauma or abuse, and somatizing disorder reported in
patients’ parents (Williams & Landa, 2014).
Servan-Schreiber and colleagues (2000) describe four commonly associated mechanisms
which arise in somatizing patients and their families. A patient’s anxiety and focused attention
on bodily sensation can elevate sensation to discomfort, which reinforces the patient’s anxiety
about being physically unwell. Consequently, families tend to organize around the somatizing
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family member, and – although dysfunctional – the illness becomes a stabilizing and anxietyreducing characteristic of the family system; the family system becomes invested in the illness.
Somatizing complaints then increase and decrease as a function of stress – especially in people
who “do not have the vocabulary to present their distress in any other way” (p. 1076, as cited in
Barsky & Klerman, 1983). Here, the patient can read as invested in being sick, since the
sickness offers relief from stress. Finally, somatic symptoms are often associated with
dissociative symptoms like flashbacks, out of body experiences and depersonalization, in which
the patient’s central nervous system activates pain centers in the absence of physically painful
stimuli. McDaniel and colleagues (2014) offer another potential explanation for individuals’
tendency to focus on physical pain. They suggest that children in families with alexithymic
members receive attention for physical pain, but no attention for emotional pain, and effectively
learn that any kind of pain manifests physically – these children do not develop the capacity to
describe emotional pain, and remain constricted to speaking about any ailment in terms of
physical symptoms. Clearly, somatizing symptoms can manifest themselves in myriad ways –
the effects surpassing the individual – often involving complicated family dynamics. Despite the
vast accrual of data leading to these associations with somatizing, full understanding of the
etiology of somatizing remains elusive.
Advances in neurology have confirmed the fact that all parts of the body are connected to
a unitary system. In his latest book, The Divided Mind: The Epidemic of Mindbody Disorders,
Dr. John Sarno (2006) classifies psychosomatic disorders as a subset of “psychogenic disorders,
which can be defined as any physical disorders induced or modified by the brain for
psychological reason” (p. 9). Sarno’s conceptualization (not empirically tested, though
anecdotally popular), is that all pain is psychogenic – subjectively experienced – designed to
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distract the subject from unconscious conflict. Sarno’s view provides counterpoint to a popular
tendency in which physicians dichotomize and split mind and body, implicitly assuming
primarily organic origins for physical symptoms. His view is consistent with McDaniel et al.’s
(2014) suggestion that “the complex disorder of somatization symbolizes our culture’s struggle
to recognize the integration and interdependence of physical and emotional aspects of life” (p.
216). Additional explication of somatizing will be covered in the section on psychoanalytic
considerations, and in the discussion.

Technology/Smartphones
“I was on the train, and before I knew it, I was playing a game on my phone.”
-

Somatizing patient in group setting

Children text each other rather than talk face to face or - for that matter - rather
than daydream, where they can take time alone with their thoughts. (Turkle,
2015, p.4)
“It’s easy today to be distracted. You actually have to defend your time in order to
have a long thought.”
-

James Taylor, 2016

Smartphone use is becoming ubiquitous, and individuals are becoming increasingly
dependent on their devices – especially when it comes to texting (Smith, 2011; 2015a; 2015b).
Smartphones are also becoming increasingly prevalent for video gaming, which can offer
individuals escape or distraction (Sherry et al, 2006; Yee, 2006 as cited in Bowman et al, 2015).
To this end, casual games – those designed to have no end, that present players with a platform
to occupy themselves for as little or as long as they like, with easy-to-learn rules, and levels of
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ever-increasing difficulty (Portnow, 2009) – have become the primary choice of smartphone
gamers (Kim, 2013 as cited in Bowman et al, 2015).
The fact that people are drawn to smartphones as the most recent technological
innovation is not surprising. Freud (1930) describes man’s use of technology as an act of
“perfecting his own organs…removing the limits to their functioning” (p. 4488). He highlights
the appeal of technology by likening the motivation to improve as “an actual fulfilment of every
– or of almost every – fairy-tale wish…Man has, as it were, become a kind of prosthetic God.
When he puts on all his auxiliary organs he is truly magnificent; but those organs have not grown
on to him and they still give him much trouble at times. Nevertheless, he is entitled to console
himself with the thought that this development will not come to an end precisely with the year
1930 A.D. Future ages will bring with them new and probably unimaginably great advances in
this field of civilization and will increase man’s likeness to God still more. But in the interests of
our investigations, we will not forget that present-day man does not feel happy in his Godlike
character” (p. 4489). Freud’s words support the notion that while smartphones provide a
subjective sense of power and connectedness with their ease of search and abundant social
network capabilities, individuals who derive feelings of power and connectedness from a
technological substrate tend to find themselves lonely and unhappy. McLuhan (1964) seems to
echo Freud’s reminder of what is real in the face of fantasy by underscoring technology’s power
to inhibit individuals’ experiences of physiological sensations: “Any invention or technology is
an extension or self-amputation of our physical body…” It is a small leap, then, to suggest that
technology may also have an important effect on augmenting or attenuating aspects of psychical
processes and development; this is precisely what Turkle (2015, 2018) argues. Turkle (2018)
writes, “[Digital culture]…tempts us to forget what it can only simulate: the body. In every
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relationship, digital culture challenges us to reaffirm our commitment to presence and the
significance of ‘being there’” (p. 17). As the smartphone distracts from unpleasant affect,
preconscious processes can be hijacked, catalyzing repression by shrinking the path between the
systems Ucs. and Cs.: Somatizing follows in that what cannot be bound in representation,
returns to the body in the form of somatization.
Further, Turkle’s work suggests that the encroachment of text-based
(non)communication has eroded the spontaneity and fantasy life that exists in the nuance of
discourse. In 1995, when discussing home computers, Turkle wrote that, in addition to getting a
practically useful object, “…now [the computer] is in their home and they interact with it every
day. And it turns out they are also getting an object that teaches them new ways of thinking and
encourages them to develop new expectations about the kinds of relationships they and their
children will have with machines” (p. 49). Turkle’s work on Multi-User Domains (MUDs) at the
bourgeoning stages of popular internet use predicted the overwhelming appeal of devices as
objects capable of being used to mold the act of thinking – and feeling.
In her most recent book, Turkle (2015) explicates the psychical causes and effects of
pervasive technology use in western culture. She describes the trend towards technology and
text as eroding humans’ ability to be empathic, citing a study that found a 40 percent decline in
empathy among college students in the last 30 years - most of which occurred in the last 10 years
- that linked decreased empathy to the advent of mobile phones (Konrath, O’Brien, & Hsing,
2011 as cited in Turkle, 2018). Turkle’s sociological and psychological work highlights
tendencies in which individuals are compelled to attach themselves to their phones at the expense
of being with other people, and being alone. She cites Winnicott (1958) in explaining the
developmental achievement of the capacity to be alone. Winnicott makes it clear that he is not
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referring to physical aloneness; rather, a capacity to sit in solitude with one’s thoughts, and take
for granted the existence of others. The capacity to sit in solitude is a developmental milestone,
and provides a substrate upon which a self can develop. While individuals experience a range of
feelings, including emotional comfort, in the presence of smartphones, smartphones fall short of
being true transitional objects: Transitional objects are not utilitarian (i.e. a child’s transitional
blanket is not used primarily for warmth), and only provide emotional comfort; smartphones do
not withstand the love and aggression that destroy true transitional objects; smartphones do not
have the characteristic smells and textures that facilitate connection to the original (parental
object).
Developmentally, it falls to the caretaker to create a world in which the infant can turn
inward and delight in her imagination without being anxious about disconnection.
Disconnection, of course, is a necessary developmental opportunity that smartphones constantly
prevent.
While so-called ‘smart’ devices promise to promote connectivity, marriage to these
devices not only creates a potential psychological barrier in the path toward developing a self,
but it also creates a new physical ‘limb’ of the body to attend to: One that draws so much
attention, perhaps to the detriment of other aspects of individuals' bodies and minds.
Let us now turn to psychoanalytic literature to help explore the connection between
smartphone use and somatizing.
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Psychoanalytic Considerations
Freud, the Preconscious, and Somatizing
In his 1915 work, The Unconscious, Freud asserts and defends the existence of the
unconscious, and explicates his first topographical theory. Freud delineates between different
characteristics of the psyche, and notes that the labels “unconscious” and “conscious” are
insufficient to deliver an exhaustive description of all that is psychical. Instead, Freud prefers to
focus on systems that he introduces, and the goings on between them. In using the words
conscious (Cs.) and unconscious (Ucs.), Freud describes categorical systems that include ranges
of psychical processes, and outlines the conditions under which psychical content, ideational
derivatives of instincts, may or may not transition between the system Ucs. and the system Cs.
The process is subject to a censor, which acts to repress thoughts at boundaries between systems
and subsystems with the goal of “suppressing the development of affect” (p. 3001). Importantly,
Freud introduces an intermediary construct describing the state of psychical acts which have
passed through the censor and can become conscious, but are not yet conscious. He calls this
space, contained in the system Cs., preconscious (Pcs.). Freud explains that affects are not
unconscious: Rather, what is repressed is the idea associated with affect. “The whole difference
arises from the fact that ideas are cathexes…whilst affects and feelings correspond to processes
of discharge, the final manifestations of which are perceived as feelings” (p. 3001). He
continues to say, “the system Cs. normally controls affectivity as well as access to motility; and
it enhances the importance of repression, since it shows that repression results not only in
withholding from consciousness, but also in preventing the development of affect and the
setting-off of muscular activity” (p. 3002). Freud then delves deeper into the system Cs., and
explicates repression by introducing the notion of anticathexis, “by means of which the system
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Pcs. protects itself from the pressure upon it of the unconscious idea” (p. 3003). In instances of
anxiety hysteria, when an intolerable impulse from the system Ucs. perturbs the Ucs./Cs.
boundary, Pcs. cathexis recedes from the approaching idea; this withdrawal of emotional or
libidinal investment – this anticathexis – facilitates the repression of the intrusive idea. At this
juncture, the release of the original unconscious cathexis emerges as anxiety. To deal with the
emergent anxiety, the individual creates for himself a substitutive idea to help rationalize his
fear, further displacing the original idea from its associated affect. This process snowballs as the
individual subsequently seeks to protect himself from second- and third-order anxiety, and the
idea becomes displaced from instinct to the extent that the individual has succeeded in creating a
psychic world in which the environment generates that which is to be feared – a phobia.
When an organism is unable to cathect the abundance of instinct emanating from the
system Ucs., the excessive instinct goes into repression. Repression of uncathected instinct
creates pressure, experienced as anxiety. Instinct can never become conscious; however, what
can become conscious, via the system Pcs., is the idea associated with said instinct.
Considering somatizing alongside Freud’s ideas, Alexander (1950) explained that
prolonged unconscious emotional disturbances like those first seen in Freud’s cases of
conversion hysteria could be expressed through chronic disturbances in the body. Further,
Alexander elucidated and differentiated between conversion symptoms, voluntary functional
disturbances, analogous to laughter, in which the release of emotional tension is connected to its
generative idea, and vegetative neurosis of the stomach, bowels, and cardiovascular system, in
which dysfunction is not an attempt to express emotion – but rather a reaction to constant or
periodic emotional states. Importantly, Alexander noted that when investigated under a
microscope, individuals with these ailments indicated no morphological differences from healthy
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individuals. He defined a psychosomatic approach to treatment that included “simultaneous and
coordinated use of somatic – i.e. physiological, anatomical, pharmacological, surgical, and
dietary – methods and concepts on one hand, and psychological methods on the other” (p. 50).
Alexander cited Freud’s ideas in stating:
Every neurosis consists, to a certain degree, of withdrawal from action, in the substitution
of autoplastic processes for action…In psychoneuroses without physical symptoms,
motor activity is replaced by psychological activity, by acting in fantasy instead of
reality. The division of labor in the central nervous system, however, is not disturbed.
The psychoneurotic symptoms are based on the activity of the central nervous system, the
function of which is the control of external relationships. This holds true also for the
conversion hysteria. Here, too, the symptoms are localized in the voluntary and the
sensory-perceptive system, which deals with the external affairs of the organism. Every
neurotic disturbance of vegetative function, however, consists in a disturbance of the
division of labor within the nervous system. In these cases, outward-directed action is
omitted and the unrelieved emotional tension induces chronic internal vegetative
changes. In those cases which are based on sympathetic preponderance this disturbance
of the division of labor is not so thoroughgoing as in those in which a parasympathetic
excitation prevails. Sympathetic functions, as we have seen, take an intermediary
position between internal vegetative functions and outwardly directed action; they tune
up and change the vegetative functions in a way that is conducive to action directed
toward the solution of external problems. In disturbances where there is a sympathetic
hyperactivity, the organism does not go into action, although it undergoes all those
preparatory changes which are conducive to action and necessary for it. If this were
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followed by action, the process would be normal. The neurotic nature of the condition is
that the whole physiological process never comes to consummation…The patient
suffering from gastrointestinal symptoms reacts to the need for action with paradoxical
vegetative responses: for example, he prepares himself to be fed instead of to fight (p.
65).
According to Alexander, somatizing arises in individuals who do not act upon
preparatory physiological changes induced by external factors; somatic symptoms arise when the
individual chronically fails to act in a way consistent with the body’s cues. Alexander uses his
theory to link different personality types to specific somatizing tendencies (Jurist, 2018;
McDougall, 1989). Several of Alexander’s contemporaries also included personality type in the
etiology of physical symptoms. Among others, McDougall (1989) cites Dunbar (1943), who
linked personality to heart disease, and Friedman and Rosenman (1959), who associated “Type
A” personality with heart disease. In 1978, the American Heart Association claimed those with
“Type A” personality are five times more likely to have a second heart attack than those without
said personality type (Macdougall, 1989).
More recent psychoanalytic writing on somatizing has shifted emphasis away from
personality and has focused instead on the role of language and symbolizing – importantly,
researchers link the absence of symbolizing and representation with increased somatizing
symptoms. McDougall (1989) and Jurist (2018) cite researchers Marty, M’Uzan, and David
(1963) of the “Paris School” for their contribution of the idea of operatory thinking, “a pragmatic
and affectless way of relating both to oneself and to other people, a form of relationship that
appears to be largely delibidinized” (p. 23). Connected to this idea is alexithymia, described by
Nemiah and his colleagues (1976), which is characterized cognitively by an inability to identify
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and verbalize feelings, and an absence of fantasy life. Alexithymia has also been shown to have
an affective dimension, in which individuals have difficulty reacting to and experiencing their
emotions (Bermond et al., 2007). Alexithymia has been associated with somatization (Waller &
Scheidt, 2004); further, Jurist (2018) cites Mattila et al. (2008) and Taylor and Bagby (2013),
who point out that difficulty in identifying feelings has been linked to somatizing, independent of
somatic diseases, anxiety, and depression (p. 19).
Theoreticians from Paris School of Psychosomatics have written extensive about
somatizing, and have developed a rich and comprehensive theory rooted in Freudian thought that
explains the prototypical somatizing patient (e.g. Aisemberg, 2010; Aisenstein, 2010; Bronstein,
2010; Green, 2010; Levy, 2010; Smadja, 2010). Their perspective is rooted in the attempt to
understand how individuals deal with endogenous stimulation, and underscores the role of the
boundary between soma, the physical body and its excitations (reality), and psyche, the apparatus
which converts that which the soma generates into drive by imbuing it with representation.
According to Levy (2010), fundamentally, psychosomatic disorders can be understood two
distinct ways: The first explains somatizing as a consequence of negotiating unconscious
fantasies in psychic conflict; the second explains the phenomenon as a result of a deficit in
psychic structure and an incapacity to function symbolically. Levy understands somatizing as a
manifestation of a disorganizing function, the death instinct. Individuals in the latter category
evacuate excess drive as psychosomatic disorders. Importantly, that which is evacuated has no
meaning and is the somatic representation of the excess instinct on the ill-equipped psyche.
“This non-structuring functioning may be the origin of somatic disorders” (Aisemberg, 2010, p.
186). In such patients, we can understand pure somatizing as a manifestation of the death drive,
that which strips of meaning and disorganizes. With this in mind, Aisemberg explains that “Eros
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and Thanatos are of different essence. Eros is an organized drive represented in the psyche,
whereas Thanatos is a disorganized quantity, pre-psychic, or on the border between soma and
psyche. The former undergoes the vicissitudes of psychoneurotic functioning, while the latter
prevails in non-neurotic functioning” (p. 189). Per Freud, individuals who are organized by, and
maintain energetic homeostasis by repression of already symbolized content are classified as
psychoneurotic. In contrast, Green introduced the term non-neurotic, which Aisemberg uses to
describe the latter form of functioning, which includes the somatizing patient. Green (2010)
states that the psychosomatic patient is cut off from the unconscious, and uses Marty’s notion of
projective reduplication to describe the somatizer’s compulsive relationship to the same – of an
interaction with a “stereotyped alterity” (p. 35) - and of being unable to thrive and evolve
through interaction with otherness. Here reduplication is associated with a replication, or a
nonproductive repetition. Green defines a psychosomatic structure as one in which there is a
bifurcation between conscious organization and the psychosomatic illness, and attributes the
following to Marty:
This effect of the shrinking of the preconscious, the reduction of the quantity and quality
of its properties, particularly its representative properties…We find ourselves faced with
a situation in which the conscious discourse and the somatic structure are face to face.
Everything that would be needed to form a buffer between the two or to reveal what is
going on under the surface is extremely precarious, highly fragile, and even, perhaps,
potentially dangerous to mobilize. This creates within the psychical structure relations
with non-meaning of which we have little idea. The somatic illness continues to remain
stubbornly on the side of non-meaning [as a] rejection of a possible relation with the
psychical” (p.79).
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Without preconscious activity, there is no function allowing for the organization and
elevation of exogenous and endogenous stimuli to word-representations: This mental process
serves the function of attaching bodily sensations and visual images to language. Aisenstein
(2010) describes somatic disorganization as a “[consequence] of an impossibility of the psyche
to decode or translate the exigent demands of the body” (p.98). She highlights a spectrum
ranging from the most organic (soma) to the most psychic (word-presentation), in which drive
energy originating in the soma is elevated to different degrees by designation to a symbolic order
in the psyche. This transition also occurs during free association and dreaming, which
establishes organizing links and is the reason prototypical somatizing patients who to not
symbolize have difficulty responding to the psychoanalytic task.
McDougall’s (1989) own theory emerged from her experience with somatizing patients
who did not display operatory thinking tendencies or alexithymia. She distinguishes between
neurotic and psychotic patients - both of whose psychic problems stem from issues in
symbolization and representation that are steeped in language - and the somatizing patients,
whose issues she traces to a time before psyche and soma were separated: a pre-verbal stage
when a mother served as the child’s thinking apparatus. Her writing echoes Bionian ideas of the
early infant’s embodied thoughts, but stops short of exploring thinking and feeling along the
lines of Matte Blanco. According to Ogden (2009), somatic symptoms result from accumulation
of beta elements that are not alphabetized, and dreamed as dreams; instead, they are perceived as
“hallucinations and dreamlike flashes, which may be visual, auditory, gustatory, kinesthetic, or
olfactory. In this model, there may be evacuative ‘rivals,’ as in the case of physical tics or
phenomena such as enuresis or the various forms of incontinence that may be expressed in
different ways…” (Ferro & Foresti, 2013, p. 387). As these authors note, and an idea this study
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continues to return to, what cannot be represented and psychically metabolized returns to the
body.

Freud, the Preconscious, Matte Blanco, and Technology
Returning to Freud for a moment: Importantly, in a direction converse to the anticathexis
it employs in service of repression – the system Pcs. also facilitates the undoing of repression –
that which allows thoughts to emerge with associated affect. At this juncture, it is worth
providing a brief overview of Freud’s ideas regarding processes within the system Ucs., in
contrast to processes within the systems Pcs. and Cs., to underscore the drastic differences
between systems, and to elucidate the important Pcs. activity that mediates between systems.
Freud (1900; 1914) explains that the system Ucs. is characterized by what he calls primary
processes: (i) displacement; (ii) condensation; (iii) absence of time; (iv) replacement of external
by psychical reality; and (v) absence of mutual contradiction. To underscore the critical,
nontriviality of transforming unconscious content – a process which Green and others locate in
the preconscious – it is useful to invoke Matte Blanco. I describe this in detail to so the reader
will appreciate the complexity of the processes that excessive smartphone use can disrupt.
Matte Blanco (1975) uses mathematical logic to explain the rules governing the system
Ucs., which he derives both from Freud’s ideas and his clinical work with schizophrenic patients.
Indeed, we see semblance to content found in Freud’s work cited above, but in a more
generalized form. Matte Blanco summarizes his own ideas when explaining the logic by which
the unconscious is governed by presenting two principles. The principle of generalization
indicates:
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The system unconscious treats an individual thing (person, object, concept) as if it
were a member or element of a set or class which contains other members; it
treats this class as a subclass of a more general class, and this more general class
as a subclass or subset of a still more general class, and so on (p. 38).
Matte Blanco’s second principle, the principle of symmetry indicates:
The system unconscious treats the converse of any relation as identical with the
relation. In other words, it treats asymmetrical relations as if they were
symmetrical.
Prior to invoking mathematical set theory and logic, Matte Blanco gives the reader a brief
overview of mathematical set theory, including symbolic notation and conventions, the specifics
of which are beyond the scope of this study. Note that Matte Blanco uses the word ‘relation’ in
the most general sense. 5 The corollaries of the principles of generalization and symmetry,
defined above, can be used to derive Freud’s characteristics of primary process. Symmetry
eliminates temporality, and in general, ordinality. This consequence of symmetry immediately
brings to mind Freud’s notion of atemporality of the unconscious. A second tenet, which Matte
Blanco derives from the principle of symmetry, teaches that the part is equivalent to the whole,
and vice versa. Relations that are, by conventional logic, unidirectional, are treated as
bidirectional in the unconscious. The Son becomes equivalently parent to the Father, and the
Hand also becomes a part of – alternatively, one with - the Finger. Matte Blanco continues to
derive correlates and introduces the notion that under the logic of symmetry, all elements of a set

“Father to Son” and “Hand to Finger” are two examples of, in this case, nouns governed by relations of various
types. In the first case, ‘father’ and ‘son’ can be defined by the relation, “a descendent of,” as in ‘Son’ “is a
descendent of” ‘Father’. In the second example, ‘Hand’ and ‘Finger’ can be associated by the relation ‘is a part of,’
as in ‘Finger’ “is a part of” ‘Hand’. These examples were chosen specifically because the reader will find that there
is a natural intuitive order to these relations: they are directional. We will soon see this break down, as developed in
Blanco’s theory.
5
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individually become identical, both as a function of what defines that set, and also as a function
of what does not define that set – a collapse into unity. Freud’s displacement can be understood
as a special case of this corollary: In a symmetric mode of being, the object onto which emotion
is displaced becomes identical to the object for which it is a substitute, as it they are now
members of the same nested set. This notion contradicts axioms taken for granted in the
asymmetrical world of the system Cs. that we consciously live in, and seems to allow for a
collapse of difference into unity. Matte Blanco’s use of logical notation offers a method that
explicates the ways in which the unconscious violates those rules that we take for granted in
everyday life.
Matte Blanco’s reinterpretation of Freud’s topographical model as a fundamental
antinomy is explicated here to emphasize the stark difference between two modes of being: Of
symmetry, as in the system Ucs., and asymmetry, as in the system Cs. The antinomy of the mind
is characterized by incompatible ways of being: Infinite vs. finite; unity vs. differentiation.
Matte Blanco (1998) goes on to explain how difficult it is – impossible, in fact, in the case of
unrepressed unconscious content – for unconscious content in the system Ucs. to emerge in the
system Cs. The format of bi-logical, or symmetrically structured, content cannot be “read” by
the system Cs. He leaves room for emotions – bi-logical structures themselves – to emerge in
some form, but notes, “our descriptions of our feelings are always hazy” (p. 91, his emphasis).
We can therefore be aware of derivatives of unconscious content, but our conscious awareness
cannot be the same as said content. Modification of the content must occur to enable the system
Cs. apparatus to become aware of what originally belonged to the system Ucs. For this
important work, Freud uses the words transformation, translation, and transposition in
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describing the process of emergence in the system Cs. of an idea, previously confined to the
system Ucs.
At this juncture, before delving into the significance of Freud’s words, it is important to
distinguish between two parallel explanations of the distortion unconscious content must be
subjected to in order to become conscious. On one hand, Freud explains the emergence of
repressed content as substitutive formations and symptoms, becoming knowable as a function of
the degree to which uninhabitable ideas are concealed. On the other hand, Matte Blanco
describes unconscious content as consciously unknowable because of its inherently symmetric
format, utilizing set theory and cardinality to explain the impossibility of conscious containment
of unconscious content. Both thinkers allude to a process by which unconscious content must be
altered to facilitate transition from one system to the other; I argue that Freud’s explication can
be derived from Matte Blanco’s postulates.
Returning now to transformation, translation, and transposition – the fact that Freud uses
three different words - each differently nuanced - in his attempt to describe the process by which
unconscious content becomes conscious speaks to its complexity. Freud (1915) tasks the system
Pcs. with the complex and critical role of mediating bidirectional psychic movement between the
systems. “To consciousness the whole sum of psychical processes presents itself as the realm of
the preconscious,” he writes, later followed by “A very great part of this preconscious originates
in the unconscious, has the character of its derivatives and is subjected to a censorship before it
can become conscious. Another part of the Pcs. is capable of becoming conscious without any
censorship…Now it becomes probably that there is a censorship between the Pcs. and the Cs.”
(p. 3014). The system Pcs. is unique in that it has qualities of both systems, and is the interface
through which the system Cs. accesses the system Ucs.; further, Freud links the psychoanalytic
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imperative – speaking without inhibition – as an integral part of overthrowing the censorship
between the system Pcs. and system Cs., and explains that “overthrowing [the system Pcs.]
censorship open[s] up the way to abrogating the repression accomplished [at the boundary of the
Ucs.]” (p. 3015). Freud seems to be suggesting that the Pcs., which overlaps with and bridges
the systems Ucs. and Cs., plays a vital role in therapeutic aspects of the psychoanalytic process.
Freud states that outward psychic development (in the Ucs. –> Pcs. –> Cs. direction) can be a
laborious task, requiring effort to catalyze. This is the point that I am underscoring. As Jurist
(2014) simply states, “The gap between knowing and feeling is persistent, even if it can be
transcended” (p. 496). Given the complex changes unconscious format must undergo to become
conscious, it is not surprising that Freud would label the task ‘laborious’. Overuse of texting and
engaging in casual game-playing on smartphones as a way of avoiding internal conflict inhibits
the mind’s ability to do the important work of hypercathecting – “a ‘preconscious’ mental act in
which repression becomes disrupted” (Loewald, 1980, p. 188), thereby perpetuating repression.
In his paper on use of the preconscious in clinical application, Green (1974) states that
“the preconscious is a binding agency of mental energy, linking the primary and secondary
processes” (p. 417 – Green’s italics). Green is underscoring the work of preconscious activity.
He cites the importance of language in secondary processes, and echoes Freud’s (1940)
quotation: “The inside of the ego, which comprises above all thought-processes has the quality of
being preconscious” (p. 420). Green also builds on Freud’s construction of an overlap between
the systems Pcs. and Ucs. – suggesting that preconscious processes includes primary fantasies –
and then outlines how the analyst can use the preconscious in working towards the unconscious.
As referenced in the introduction, Green likens the overlap of preconscious - to which one has
conscious access in certain circumstances – and unconscious to Winnicott’s (1953) notion of
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transitional space, in which there is an overlap of fantasy and reality. With Matte Blanco and
Freud in mind, we can expand this idea with the thought that the preconscious is a place of
overlap of symmetrical and asymmetrical modes of being. Green suggests that the preconscious
is the playing field of therapist and patient – where the fantasy of transference and unconscious
conflict can be worked through – psychically, where Freud’s “laborious process” takes place. It
represents a function which provides a bidirectional mapping between internal and external
experience – between symmetry and asymmetry - and, analogous to the idea that Winnicott’s
(1971) potential space is the only bridge between fantasy and reality, the preconscious is the only
means by which the system Ucs. and Cs. can communicate (Freud, 1915; Green, 1974; Civin &
Lombardi, 1990).
However, I am suggesting that constant digital engagement blocks the channel that is the
preconscious by prohibiting individuals from occupying that playing field, that place of solitude,
that place that becomes the source of creativity: “[C]hildren who grow up digital have always
had something external to respond to. When they go online, their minds are not wandering but
rather are captured and divided” (Turkle, 2015, p.61). This act of “wandering” is precisely the
function of preconscious activity. Rapaport (1951) contrasts daydreams and preconscious
thought processes from normal waking state, suggesting that the difference results from varying
forms or intensities of hypercathexes – he explains, echoing Freud, that it is precisely the
“countercathectic energy distribution [that] controls the transition from preconscious to
conscious processes” (p. 718). For individuals like the group patient I quoted above, whose
smartphone use has become – to use Rapaport’s lingo – autonomous (“before I knew it…”), it is
not a far leap to suggest that the device is utilized by the preconscious as one tool that facilitates
countercathectic energy distribution.
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“…[W]hen I hear lovers say that they prefer to “talk” by editing a text on their
smartphones, when I hear families say that they air their differences on email to avoid face-toface tension… I hear a desire for distraction, comfort, and efficiency. But I also know that these
moves won’t allow conversation to do the work it can do” (Turkle, p. 9). What is the work of
conversation, of speech, of language, to which Turkle is alluding? And how can the immense
draw to technology and smartphones be understood? It is fitting that, in the next sentence, Turkle
writes, “We are being silenced by our technologies – in a way, ‘cured of talking’” (p. 9). Here,
her purposeful inversion of Freud’s description of psychoanalysis – the “talking cure” – alludes
to important psychical processes – present while engaging in real life, verbal conversation – that
are at best interfered with and at worst completely stifled when limited to – and even simply in
the vicinity of (Przybylski & Weinstein, 2012) – technological media and text.
The preconscious is tied to talking – to language. Language has an essential role in the
transformation from unconscious to conscious: Language turns thought into perception (Green,
1974). For some, the introduction of smartphones has been an assault on language and on
creative discourse – the means by which affect is represented and, to the extent possible, bound
in thought. Being with smartphones risks a hijacking of our imaginations, preventing us from
being. With the proliferation of smartphones, society is no longer using language in the same
way. Returning to Loewald (1980): “[L]anguage, being a vehicle for secondary process…a
medium of hypercathexis that creates higher organization, in its most genuine and autonomous
function is a binding power. It ties together human beings and self and object world, and it binds
abstract thought with the bodily concreteness and power of life. In the word primary and
secondary process are reconciled” (p. 204). Loewald elevates the linking of word- and thingrepresentation to the notion of a novel perceptual experience, which highlights the power of
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language to change one’s subjective understanding reality. Freud also links preconscious process
to language: Speech has the capacity to link feelings and thoughts, bind affect by representation,
and create a new reality of experience. Loewald explains that thing-representations become
“hypercathected” by becoming linked with corresponding word-representations in the
preconscious. Importantly, the word representation itself is not a higher organization – rather, it
is the linking which signifies increased complexity. Repression, according to Loewald, severs
the link between word- and thing- representations, bringing about a less sophisticated
organization. He describes that in primary process words and things are not differentiated – both
refer to “global states of affairs” (p. 187), and he outlines a developmental trajectory of
secondary process which is signified by the infant’s utterances. Undoing repression, “linking in
secondary process is a rejoining of what once was: A reconciliation” (p. 188). Loewald
creatively alters the notion of cathexis by describing different types of cathexes: Identificatory
cathexes and objectifying cathexes, aligning with vectors pointed in the primary process and
secondary process directions, respectively. As people regress, the capacity to differentiate breaks
down, mobilizing narcissistic, identificatory cathexis. Returning to Loewald’s quote from above
that underscores the role of language: “Developed language is a vehicle for articulating complex
experiences or thought processes, for making explicit their elements and the mutual connections
between these elements, for ‘scanning’ experience and thought point by point, thus rendering
present their immanent textured structure” (p. 196). In Matte Blancian terms, Loewald states
that secondary process outlines the interstices between infinite sets, creating differentiation in the
unity that is the system Ucs. Further, as will be explained below, this sentiment can also be
understood to tie language to mentalized affectivity.
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If, as Loewald explains, language is the medium of hypercathexis, in altering the way
individuals use language, smartphones have the capacity to become agents of anticathexis that
inhibit preconscious thought, and attenuate objectifying cathexes. The more smartphones are
used to this end, the less processing of unconscious conflict can occur (i.e. more repression).
We now return to Rapaport. Rapaport (1951) lays out a theory wherein thinking emerges
from sequelae induced initially by drive needs, in the direction of gratification, or tension
release. Rapaport highlights the fact that action is always objected directed, since the drive
object is a prerequisite for discharge. He describes projection by explaining that as the need
tension mounts in the absence of the need-satisfying object, a hallucinatory image of the object
(or the gratifying experience) arises; this projection is a memory that is cathected – charged with
energy from the drive – and thus made conscious. In this way, Rapaport defines the “cradle of
conscious experience” (p. 690) as cathexes of memory traces. He generalizes this notion to
ideas, which are indicators of drive tension, and discharge a fraction of the drive cathexes.
Similarly, tension brings about affect expression and discharge, which Rapaport states is not
object directed, but is rather drive cathexis discharged into the motor and secretory systems of
the body. Rapaport outlines the facets of the psyche that are structural: The apparatus which
forms memory traces; tension tolerance thresholds; cathexis discharge capacities of affect and
idea; idiosyncratic connection between drive and satisfying object; and the intensity of the drive,
and how it is distributed between motor and secretory systems. All together, these constraints
provide the “machinery” for ego autonomy, forming what Rapaport calls “ego apparatuses.”
When – partially as a function of the constitutional factors previously listed – ideas and affect are
not sufficient to release drive tension, drive cathexes can become repressed via censorship by
countercathexes, or can be bound, whereby goal directed thinking, or secondary process,
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emerges. Here, Rapaport describes the formation of partial drives, in which there is no longer a
one-to-one link between drives and ideas. Rather, mobility of cathexis allows systems of
connected ideas to emerge – becoming the experience of reality – and allows for detours, no
longer seeking complete release. Analogous to the way atoms form lattices as a way of
minimizing potential energy, systems of countercathexes form, with an overall saving of
cathectic energy – this Rapaport terms ‘repression proper.’ Importantly, Rapaport introduces the
idea of hypercathexis – also called attention-cathexis – which determines what makes conscious
experience. Rapaport states that for ideas to become conscious, they need to be allowed by the
censor, and subsequently hypercathected. Preconscious ideas are those which are not
countercathected, but also not hypercathected.
I cite Rapaport to underscore the notion that consciousness firstly requires cathectic
energy, and that countercathectic (energetic) organizations are used in defensive processes. For
some, smartphones expend cathectic energy in the service of defense, rendering individuals
unable to attend to other emotional conflicts they may be experiencing. Since the defensive
structure – facilitated by smartphones – works well, it is maintained, and individuals remain
depleted of the additional energy necessary to cathect conflicts in which they are entrenched.
The extent to which an individual finds herself incapable of disengaging with
smartphones calls into question smartphones’ effect on ego autonomy. Rapaport (1951; 1957)
outlines a theory on ego autonomy, explicating that which renders the ego both autonomous from
the drives, and from external reality. Rapaport introduces the apparatus of primary autonomy,
which exists differentiated from birth and includes apparatuses of memory, motor, perception,
and drive/affect discharge threshold. Rapaport states that even in cases of severe pathology,
these apparatuses continue to function autonomously, helping individuals adapt to their
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environments. Apparatuses of secondary autonomy arise from instinctual sources, but synthesize
as functions of “experience” (Rapaport, 1957, p. 726). I am proposing that smartphones are so
effective at allying with some individuals’ defensive structures – which, incidentally, may be
why they are so popular – that for some people, entire defensive organizations are built around
smartphones. I think of my patient, James, and the generation of people who grew up, and are
currently growing up, inseparable from smartphones - significantly relying on them, as they have
never known a society in which this rectangular, palm-sized world does not exist.
Turkle explains the draw to technology as more than satisfying a craving for instant
gratification or an addiction to multitasking. When people spend time apart from their devices,
“they can’t concentrate; they say they are bored, and boredom becomes a reason to turn to their
phones for a game or a text or a Facebook update. But most importantly, it is anxiety that leads
them back to their phones” (p. 68 – this author’s italics). Turkle is illustrating what she describes
as “disconnection anxiety,” which speaks to an incapacity to be alone – an inability to rely on
one’s imagination for psychical sustenance. But what is this disconnection anxiety? What is this
“feared boredom” stemming from lulls in conversation (Turkle, 2018, p.19)? Perhaps our
reliance on smartphones has atrophied our capacity to be alone; perhaps the associated
expectation (or illusion!) of constant connectedness has engendered in us the feeling that our
imagination and creativity are not sufficient to save us from feelings of boredom: Boredom has
been rendered intolerable.
Boredom is a complex emotion with its own trove of literature. According to Eastwood
and his colleagues (2012), it has been discussed from existential perspectives (e.g. Frankl, 1984;
Maddi, 1970), in the context of arousal theory (e.g. Berlyne, 1960; Czisenmihaly, 1990),
cognitive theories (e.g. Fisher, 1993), and from psychodynamic perspectives (e.g. Fenichel,
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1953; Wangh, 1975). Here I will highlight some of what pertains to the present topic. Wangh
(1975) quotes Hartocollis (1972), who writes: “More than any other affect, boredom is
experienced as a disturbance in the sense of time, as an inability to synchronize attention with the
activities of the surroundings or, in their absence, with one's own fantasy life. The experience
generally involves a sense of impatience with the self and the environment; a sense of frustration,
dissatisfaction, and want; a vague need for something, for an interest or outlet. As such, it is an
unpleasant or painful feeling, even though it may not impress the observer as much as the
suffering [of] depression or anxiety.” Hartocollis’ description describes boredom using the
language of attention: A simultaneous urge and incapacity to attend in directions both internal
and external. Wangh (1975) suggests that in the absence of external stimuli, the mind resorts to
primary process thinking in the form of dreams and daydreams, but explains that this process is
hampered in boredom, wherein the mind finds itself in stalemate – repressing both what is
longed for and what is feared – in that moment. Similarly, Rapaport (1951) explains boredom as
the inability to attend resulting from depletion of available attention-cathexes which are instead
being used in reinforcement of countercathexes. With this understanding, for some the
smartphone may paradoxically facilitate boredom by stifling free association and blocking
preconscious thinking, leaving the individual distracted while engaging with a device, while
perpetuating underlying psychological conflicts which remain unresolved.
At this juncture, let us return to Freud’s system Pcs., the machinery and process by which
we deal with anxiety. In moments in which individuals might resort to daydreaming, accessing
preconscious activity and widening access to unconscious process, smartphones present a quick
fix, a distraction, a way to avoid and foreclose on any potential for integrative, creative, psychic
work. As mentioned above, the somatizing patient’s quote: “I was on the train, and before I
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knew it, I was playing a game on my phone,” speaks precisely to this preconscious dynamic.
Before I knew it is a key phrase, as it underscores the unconscious, autonomous, nature of the
cycle which occurs: We can conjecture that the patient felt pangs of anxiety bubbling up, and
unthinkingly and reflexively, occupied herself with a casual game on her smartphone to suppress
it. In this moment, repeated by countless individuals on line at the bank, on the subway, and in
other moments of downtime, the smartphone becomes enlisted as an agent of anticathexis,
perpetuating repression. It is tempting to conjecture that reaching for one’s phone may be the
physical act of motility accompanying a substitutive formation – “join[ing] forces with an
anticathexis from the Pcs” (Freud, 1915, p. 3013).
Overuse of smartphones can have another unfortunate consequence, in addition to
mediating anticathexes: They prevent the system Pcs. from engaging in another primary task the loosening and attenuation of repression – facilitating the reemergence of thoughts and their
associated affect. The solitude and daydreaming that has been shown to be interrupted by the
mere presence of smartphones, let alone their rampant use, signifies a shrinking preconscious
space. The more individuals’ inner worlds are narrowed by an impinging digital presence, the
less room there is for preconscious thinking, resulting in sustained repression and greater anxiety
emanating from the unconscious. Casual games have become the Swiss Army knife equivalent
of the solution to impatience, boredom, and anxiety by providing instant gratification and
distraction from psychic labor.

Smartphone as (Un)container: A Bionian Perspective
It is worth trying to understand this dynamic from a Bionian developmental perspective.
Bion (1962) presented a theory of thinking built on the notion that thoughts demand an apparatus
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to contain them – that apparatus is called “thinking.” He outlines a process by which thinking
emerges from the presence of thoughts, which form from the “mating of a pre-conception with a
frustration” (p. 303), moderated by sufficient frustration tolerance. In the absence of sufficient
frustration tolerance, “What should be a thought, a product of the juxtaposition of pre-conception
and negative realization, becomes a bad object, indistinguishable from a thing-in-itself, fit only
for evacuation” (p. 303). In normal development, the infant is able to use projective
identification to evacuate the bad feeling; it is the task of the caretaker to accept the projection,
metabolize the bad feeling and return it to the infant in tolerable form. Bion makes it clear that
his idea of consciousness at this stage differs from Freud’s in that he sees the infant as missing
the complex psychical machinery needed for an ‘unconscious.’ Rather, the infant is fully
conscious, where its “mother’s capacity for reverie is the receptor organ for the infant’s harvest
of self-sensation gained by its conscious” (p. 307). Bion introduces the alpha function, whose
role is to take all beta elements (perceptual and sensory data), and convert them into alpha
elements, or emotional pictograms (Ferro & Foresti, 2013). Beta elements include that which is
generated from within, or from without. Alpha elements, or waking dream thoughts, can be
accessed by reverie – Ferro and Foresti define countertransference in this manner, and assert that
an analyst’s access to her own pictograms can be analyzed to learn something about the patient;
“It should be borne in mind that a locus of creativity in the mind is one that leads from beta to
pictograms (alpha)…” (p. 368). Here we can link preconscious creativity with Bionian thought,
noting the following parallels: (a) Both Freud (via Matte Blanco’s extension) and Bion define
unconscious and conscious in terms of infinite and finite (Lombardi, 2009); (b) Freud and Bion,
in introducing the system Pcs. and alpha function, respectively, describe a translation of psychic
content from one form into another; (c) both constructions introduce as a moderator the
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individual’s constitution in determining how much psychic frustration can be tolerated; (d) both
Freud and Bion provide a mechanism with which to deal with emerging drives, and define the
work of therapy: For Freud, said feelings are subject to anticathexes, and become repressed.
Preconscious activity, expanded in therapy, moves content in an outward direction, as explained
above. Bion also speaks of repressed elements that emerge in session, or that must be evacuated,
with therapy helping individuals to dream their dreams in the service of cognizing affect. In
severe cases, a container for thinking must be developed with the analyst. Broadly, both Freud
and Bion introduce and explicate processes of transformation of psychic content.
Smartphones can provide people with methods of evading frustration. “A capacity for
toleration of frustration thus enables the psyche to develop thought as a means by which the
frustration that is tolerated is itself made more tolerable” (Bion, 1962, p. 303). Developmentally,
the act of tolerating frustration increases one’s tolerance, building thinking. According to
Turkle, the curated, “friction free,” interaction facilitated by text has become preferred in many
families, in which parents and children are drawn to deal with emotionally difficult issues over
text. In some families, parents have disavowed their role as the metabolizers of affect, and
children are not experiencing the environmental safety of caretakers who can tolerate a range of
affect. From a Winnicottian perspective, object use is a developmental milestone in which an
individual comes to take for granted the existence and otherness of her caretaker. It is precisely
the faith that develops with an infant’s repeated attempts to destroy her parent – and the parent’s
survival – that facilitates the transition from simply relating to object use (Tuber, 2008;
Winnicott, 1971). Turning to the smartphone as a container of affect, as, for example, “therapy”
apps suggest, distorts Winnicott’s notion of survival of the object, simplifies Bion’s construction
of a container, and can produce in the child a counterfeit sense of the otherness of objects, and a
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constricted range of tolerable emotions. Without interpersonal contact, without moments of
disruption and unison, individuals cannot develop the container to cognize affect. Attenuated
frustration tolerance combined with loss of the ability to cognize affect, resulting in evacuation
to a device, analogously reflects the Freudian dynamic highlighted above, in which the
smartphone can be seized in defense as an agent of anticathexis. Individuals unable to tolerate
anxiety expel their feelings into their device that is incapable of metabolizing their experience.
For some, the smartphone has become a metaphorical affect black hole, eliminating the
possibility for one to experience and grow from the containment of another.

Mentalized Affectivity
The literature and argument introduced thus far has brought into focus preconscious
process, affective considerations necessary for the development of an apparatus for thinking,
and, further and significantly, the notion that feeling and thinking are separate but intertwined.
An individual’s capacity to cognize affect is connected to frustration tolerance and speaks to a
developmental, psychical milestone. Both Bion and Matte Blanco emphasize the contrast
between the immensity of mental space and the spatiotemporal order introduced by the activation
of “thinking functions” (Matte Blanco, 1975, p. 529).
In the context of overwhelming affect, thinking is obliterated – the degree to which an
individual can maintain a thinking function while experiencing intense affect speaks to existing
constitutional and developmental characteristics, and/or growth established in therapy.
Lombardi (2009) highlights Bion’s model when he writes that “Infinity…is where the first forms
of mentalization develop.” Dimensional vicissitudes – in a Matte Blancian sense – inherent in
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the oscillation within and between the spaces of affect and of thought, underscore the necessity
of a function capable of mediating processes in that transition.
Mentalizing (Fonagy et al, 2012; Fonagy et al, 2002) focuses on the overlapping space
between thinking and feeling, and speaks to a regulatory process of cognizing affect in self and
others. The term mentalization, “the capacity to understand and interpret behavior in terms of
mental states, whether our own or others,” first emerged from the French School in the 1950s, as
a way of challenging mind-body dualism (Jurist, 2018, p. 84). It has since been utilized in
cognitive science circles to describe how individuals conceptualize the minds of others (BaronCohen, Tager-Flusberg, & Cohen, 2000; Carruthers & Smith, 1996, as cited in Jurist, 2018).
Mentalization can be explicitly conscious, can happen implicitly on an unconscious level (Allen,
2003), and is associated with “theory of mind, reflective functioning, mind reading, social
cognition, social understanding, emotional intelligence, perspective-taking, and empathy”
(Vrouva & Fonagy, 2009, p. 1174). The capacity to mentalize has been positively associated
with mental health (Bateman & Fonagy, 2008; Fonagy & Target, 1998), and mentalization-based
therapy has been successful in improving symptoms in patients with Borderline Personality
Disorder (Daubney & Bateman, 2015; Bateman & Fonagy, 2008). Associated with the capacity
to mentalize is epistemic trust, infants’ reliance on and trust in their caretakers to learn via verbal
and nonverbal cues, which speaks to the developmental, relational, aspect of mentalizing
(Fonagy & Allison, 2014). Epistemic trust is essential for individuals to develop the capacity to
mentalize.
Jurist (2018) cites research indicating that mentalization, evident to different degrees in
infants and toddlers, is an ongoing developmental process. The tendency to text as a way of
avoiding emotionally difficult interaction – as in the cases within families cited in Turkle (2015)
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– undermines the epistemic trust necessary for individuals to grow together, and suggests an
attenuation of cognitive and emotional flexibility. In the same work, Jurist discusses what he
calls aporetic emotions – emotions that are felt, but remain nebulous and unformulated –
examples of which include Ferro and Foresti’s (2013) notion of “proto-emotions,” which they
liken to emotions that remain unalphabetized in the absence of sufficient containment. Above, I
introduced the idea that smartphones can be used defensively, wherein emotional discomfort is
expelled into an electronic (un)container. For individuals with a lesser capacity to mentalize, the
digital distractor can serve as a soothing function, but leaves said individuals bereft of emotional
conflict resolution and actual closure. Those with the capacity to mentalize may be buffered
from this potentially negative effect of smartphone use for reasons explained below.
Mentalizing can be understood as a process of identifying, modulating, and expressing
emotions (Jurist, 2018). Identifying emotions is naturally difficult, especially since aporetic
emotions are pre-verbal. Further, Jurist (2018) notes that feelings can defend against other, more
uncomfortable feelings, which resembles Freud’s explication of substitutive phenomena in the
context of uninhabitable affects. It can be argued that the stymieing of preconscious activity
which can occur through smartphone use necessarily reduces mentalizing, and can even be
viewed as antithetical to a mentalizing stance, since tolerating emotions antecedes and catalyzes
the work of identifying emotions. Alexithymia, the condition often most associated with an
inability to identify emotions, is characterized by being unable to name and communicate
feelings, a conflation of emotions and bodily senses, and a limited fantasy life, is a prototypical
example of an inability to mentalize. Those who cannot mentalize lack the transitional space
where the playful overlap of fantasy and reality engenders creativity – this overlap is precisely
what Turkle argues disappears when overly engaged in text-based relationships. Importantly,
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Lombardi (2009) cites Bion when suggesting that the external impression of lack of affect
inherent in alexithymia may be a reaction to excess emotion, and characterizes alexithymia as an
inability to contain and represent in objective space/time – with thought – the enormity of the
subjective experience of feeling. Lombardi seems to be likening alexithymia to more than a
deficiency in mentalizing: Also a deficiency in preconscious activity! Further, Lombardi links
an infant’s experience of the “chaos of indistinct physical sensation” with early thinking, the
non-verbal nature of which was referenced in the discussion of Macdougall’s (1989) work on
somatizing. Here again, we see a collapse of a type function of translation that was associated
with preconscious processes facilitating the emergence of previously unconscious content and
the elevation of representation with language.
The work of identifying emotions facilitates the next step in mentalizing: Modulating
emotions, whereby an individual actively processes affect, alone, or if epistemic trust has been
established, with others. Importantly, the boundary between identifying and modulating
emotions is blurry; however, the capacity to tolerate affect renders both possible. Also
importantly, Jurist (2018) highlights the differences between “regulating emotion,” whereby
cognition subdues affect, and “moderating emotion,” which includes “being responsive, making
adjustments, and making efforts to blend and join together important aspects of how emotions
can be valued and revalued” (p. 30). Modulation emphasizes working creatively with affect –
playing with feelings, and in this way, can be linked to preconscious activity and transitional
space.
Expressing emotions, a third facet of mentalizing, can be understood as communication,
outward or inward, verbal and nonverbal (Jurist, 2018). In considering outward expression,
Jurist links expressing emotions to modulating emotions since both can be relational processes,
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facilitated by another. He maintains that modulating and expressing are distinct, as emotions can
be expressed independently of the extent to which they have been modulated – or identified, for
that matter. Further, Jurist explicates the complexity of expression, underscoring its connection
to both the capacity to tolerate emotions, and the cultural/familial norms about emotion
expression to which an individual may be accustomed. In light of the discussion above regarding
the erosion of epistemic trust brought on in contexts in which text is preferred to in-person
interaction, it is interesting to consider what facet of expressing emotion is being activated.6 In
some cases perhaps, given the curated, non-spontaneous nature of the interactions Turkle
describes, the decision to text emotions may be less a communication of affect, and more a
measure of emotional constriction and lack of safety.
Jurist’s (2005; 2018) introduction of mentalized affectivity (and its associated scale)
introduces the “process of making sense of emotions in light of one’s autobiographical memory
(AM) and history” (2018, p. 83). Mentalized affectivity highlights the influence of one’s history
on each facet (identifying, modulating, expressing) of mentalizing, and emphasizes a reappraisal
of affect, unique to the individual. Engaging in mentalized affectivity is a process of altering
memories of feelings in the service of gaining insight. The Mentalized Affectivity Scale (bMAS),
measures the extent to which one engages in each of the three elements of mentalizing.

Summary

The proliferation of smartphones in recent years has resulted in drastic changes in the
ways individuals spend time alone, and communicate with others. Smartphones have become a

A reaction of “lol” – “laugh(ing) out loud” – for example, when one reads a joke, is not the
actual expression of affect at the time of experiencing the joke. Perhaps it is the result of a
demand for acknowledgement or connect by the sender of the joke.
6
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primary medium of interaction, and in some cases have changed the way language is used,
providing a means of interaction devoid of elaboration and symbolization.
In a seemingly parallel trend, psychosomatic disorders continue to grow increasingly
prevalent. Psychogenic disorders are recorded in record numbers, with enigmatic etiologies and
for which exist questionable methods of treatment.
Smartphones have become objects in their own right; psychoanalysis offers interesting
perspectives in terms of the use of the object, and the overlap with language, communication,
and defenses. Freud’s explication of the systems Cs., Pcs., and Ucs., Bion’s notion of
containment, and Rapaport’s and Loewald’s extensions of drive theory provide compelling
arguments for hypothesizing a link between smartphone use and somatizing. Mentalized
affectivity, a relatively new construct that bridges thought and affect, can be understood to
moderate the effect smartphone use can have on individuals’ capacity for intimacy, and interacts
with the way smartphones are being hypothesized to interfere with the intrapsychic dynamics
described above.

Research Questions and Hypotheses

Question 1: Do individuals who engage in higher levels of smartphone use somatize more?
Hypothesis 1a: Time engaging with smartphones, as measured objectively by the
screentime application, will be positively associated with somatizing.
Hypothesis 1b: Individuals with higher scores on the SAS will report more somatizing
symptoms than those with lower scores on the SAS.

44

SMARTPHONES AND SOMATIZING – J. BERKOWITZ
Hypothesis 1c: Individuals who engage in higher levels of texting, as measured on the
MMQ (escape/express) will report more somatizing symptoms than individuals who engage in
lower levels of texting.
Hypothesis 1d: Individuals who endorse higher scores on the Refuge subscale of the
YAPS will report higher levels of somatizing than individuals who report lower scores on the
Refuge subscale. Individuals who score high in Burden on the YAPS will report lower levels of
somatizing than those who score low on the items comprising the Burden subscale.
Question 2: Do individuals who engage in higher levels of casual game playing on smartphones
report more somatic symptoms than individuals who engage in lower levels of casual game
playing?
Hypothesis 2a: Game players, as a whole, will report more somatizing symptoms than
individuals who do not play games on their smartphones.
Hypothesis 2b: Within the group that plays games, individuals who engage in higher
levels of casual game playing will report more somatizing symptoms than individuals who
engage in lower levels of casual game playing.
Question 3: Is there an association between levels of mentalized affectivity, as measured on the
bMAS, and somatizing symptoms?
Hypothesis 3: High scores on the bMAS will be associated with lower levels of
somatizing. This will be true for each factor within the bMAS scale.
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Question 4: How will mentalized affectivity level moderate the relationship between smartphone
use and somatizing?
Hypothesis 4a: Mentalized affectivity will moderate the relationship between objective
screentime and somatizing. For individuals who score higher on modulating/processing, the
positive relationship between screentime and somatizing will be weaker than for individuals who
score lower on modulating/processing. The same moderation trend is predicted for identifying
and communicating, but to a weaker extent than modulating/processing.
Hypothesis 4b: Mentalized affectivity will moderate the relationship between
smartphone addiction (SAS) and somatizing. For high mentalizers, the positive relationship
between smartphone addiction and somatizing will be weaker than for low mentalizers.
Hypothesis 4c: Mentalized affectivity will moderate the relationship between texting
motivations and somatizing. For both MMQ escape and express, individuals who report higher
levels of modulating/processing will have weaker positive correlations between MMQ scores
and somatizing scores than for individuals who score lower on modulating/processing. The
same trend will exist for identifying and communicating, but to a lesser extent.
Hypothesis 4d: Mentalized affectivity will moderate the relationship between YAPS
factors burden and refuge, and somatizing. For high mentalizers, the positive relationship
between refuge and somatizing will be weaker than for low mentalizers. The strongest effect
will be seen with modulating/processing as the moderator. Similarly, for high mentalizers, the
positive relationship between burden and somatizing will be weaker than for low mentalizers.
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Hypothesis 4e: Mentalized affectivity will moderate the relationship between casual
game playing and somatizing. For individuals who report high levels of mentalized affectivity,
the relationship between casual game playing and somatizing will be weaker than for individuals
who have lower mentalized affectivity scores. The modulating/processing factor on the bMAS
will moderate the relationship between game playing and somatizing to a greater extent than
identifying and communicating.
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Chapter 3: Methods

Data Collection
Participants were recruited using Amazon Turk, and each compensated $.50 for
participating in the study. Interested subjects were directed to a survey generated by Qualtrics
(www.qualtrics.com). Participants were then provided with general information about the study,
including eligibility requirements, and information about informed consent. Individuals who
consented to participate in the study were then directed to the survey. After completing the
survey, participants were given feedback about their scores, and offered referral information in
case they felt distressed. No identifying information was requested. Data was converted to .sav
format, and subsequently analyzed using SPSS, version 26.

Materials and Procedure
A questionnaire was developed to assess level of smartphone use, motivations for texting,
levels of game play on smartphones, somatizing, different aspects of mentalizing, and other
symptomatology7. Measurement of technology use is a relatively new field with limited
established scales and constantly emerging research regarding tools of assessment. As such this
study incorporated several smartphone-use scales, each measuring a different aspect of the
construct. The questionnaire also asked participants to report data from their iPhones’ “Screen
Time” application, which provided objective data regarding smartphone use. Included in this

7

Additional measures were collected, but are not of interest in this particular study, and will not
be reported.
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application are data about the last 7 days: total time spent on the smartphone, top five apps used,
and average number of daily pickups. Subjects were also asked whether they play games, and, if
so, which games, and to provide an estimate of how much of their screentime is spent gaming.
The questionnaire included items from the measures listed below. They were combined
and given sequentially. Participants were first asked about somatizing and other symptoms, and
then asked about mentalizing tendencies. Participants were then given questionnaires that
assessed their subjective feelings about smartphone use and the extent to which they may be
addicted to their smartphones. They were then asked to report objective screentime data from
their phones, and to state whether and how often they play games on their smartphones. Finally,
participants were asked to provide demographic information and to answer questions about
diagnoses and trauma history.

Subjective Smartphone Use
Messaging Motivations Questionnaire (MMQ; Trub, in press). To assess people’s
motivation to text, an 8-item, Likert-type, self-report scale was utilized. The MMQ was
designed to understand to get at feelings underlying texting behaviors. In previous samples, it
was found to be internally consistent (Cronbach’s Alpha = .83 for escape and .78 for express )
and showed convergent and divergent validity consistent with theoretical predictions (Trub &
Barbot, 2019) . It consists of two subscales: escape - the wish to avoid internal or external
stimuli when texting, or using texting to avoid boredom - and express - preferring texting over
other forms of expression to facilitate self-expression. Items range from 1 (never or almost
never) to 5 (always or almost always). Scores for each subscale were derived by computing
mean responses on corresponding items.
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Young Adult Attachment to Phone Scale (YAPS; Trub & Barbot, 2016). The YAPS
was designed to measure seemingly paradoxical aspects of smartphone use. Prior research has
found the YAPS to be internally consistent (Cronbach’s Alpha = .82 for refuge and .72 for
burden), and to have criterion validity, consistent with theoretical predictions (Trub & Barbot,
2016). It consists of two subscales: Refuge – feeling safe with the phone and discomfort when
without it, and Burden – relief when separated from the phone, and perception that it diminishes
joy in the present. Items range from 1 (does not describe me at all) to 5 (describes me perfectly).
Scores for each dimension were calculated by computing averages for corresponding items.
Smartphone Addiction Scale (SAS; Kwon et al., 2013). The smartphone addiction
scale (SAS) was created by modifying the K-scale – a scale measuring internet addiction. It was
used to help measure individuals’ smartphone usage tendencies and behaviors. Respondents
indicate opinions on 33 items using a Likert-type scale ranging from 1 (strongly disagree) to 6
(strongly agree). The scale measures six dimensions of smartphone addiction: daily-life
disturbance, positive anticipation, withdrawal, cyberspace-oriented relationship, overuse, and
tolerance. An overall measure of smartphone addiction is obtained by summing responses across
these dimensions, and has been shown to have concurrent validity and be reliable (Cronbach’s
alpha = .962).

Somatizing
Patient Health Questionnaire-15 (PHQ-15; Kroenke et al., 2002). The PHQ-15 was
adapted from the full Patient-Health Questionnaire (Spitzer et al., 1999) and designed to measure
somatic symptoms. Each somatic symptom item (i.e. stomach pain, back pain, etc.) is scored 0
(Not bothered at all), 1 (Bothered a little), or 2 (Bothered a lot). Scores are computed by
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summing responses of all items. The PHQ-15 is widely used in outpatient settings, and has been
shown to be reliable and valid (Kroenke et al., 2002). In a study designed to generate normative
data for the population of Germany, the scale was shown to be internally consistent (Cronbach’s
alpha = 0.82) and exhibited good construct validity when compared to scales measuring
depression and life satisfaction (Kocalevent et al., 2013).

Mentalized Affectivity
Mentalized Affectivity Scale (bMAS; Greenberg et al, in press). Mentalized
affectivity was measured using the scale by the same name. The bMAS is a 12-item self-report
scale using a 7-point Likert-type scale ranging from disagree strongly to agree strongly. Items
assess identifying, processing, and expressing emotions (see above for descriptions of each
factor). Scores for each factor were computed by calculating averages of corresponding items.
The bMAS yielded good reliability and convergent validity across each dimension. For
identifying, processing, and expressing, Cronbach’s alpha values in this study were .93, .92, and
.90, respectively. Convergent validity has been indicated with correlations to the Empathy
Quotient, an empathy scale developed by Baron-Cohen and Wheelwright (2004).

Symptomology
Brief Symptom Inventory (BSI; Derogatis, 1993). The BSI is the short version of the
SCL-R-90 (Derogis, 1992). It consists of 53 items which cover nine symptom dimensions: Each
item was scored 0 (“not bothered at all”) to 4 (“extremely”), and averages are computed for
each subscale. This study’s analysis used items from the anxiety and depression subscales.

51

SMARTPHONES AND SOMATIZING – J. BERKOWITZ
Analysis Plan
A series of regression analyses controlling for the aforementioned variables examined
relationships between somatization and objective and subjective indicators of smartphone usage
(Hypothesis 1a-1d), game playing (Hypothesis 2a & b), and mentalizing (Hypothesis 3). Hayes’
PROCESS macro (2013; Model 1) was then used to test the moderation predictions outlined in
Hypotheses 4a – 4e. Continuous variables were mean-centered prior to analyses. Results are
reported only for the variables of interest, but see Tables 6-18 for detailed results.
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Chapter 4: Results

Participants
Participants were required to be English-speaking, live in the United States, and use an
iPhone. The participant pool was recruited via Amazon Mechanical Turk. A total of 700 people
completed the entire survey. Of those 700 people, a total of 684 people indicated they were
between the ages of 18 and 65. Of those 684 people, 601 people completed the survey in 10
minutes or longer. Participants with response times shorter than 10 minutes were removed to
ensure minimal carelessness or inattention. Of those 601 people, 10 responses were removed
because they had a duplicate IP Address (who was already in the dataset; out of the duplicate
pair, we removed the response that had taken less time to complete the survey, operating under
the assumption that more time spent completing the survey was associated with increased
conscientiousness in answering). Of those remaining, we removed screentime outliers (more
than 86 hours weekly), and participants who reported extreme low screentime (less than two
hours weekly). People who reported no screentime were eliminated on the basis that this study
required active smartphone users; participant usage was capped at approximately 1.5 standard
deviations above the mean. As a result, 511 participants were retained for analyses.
Of the 511 participants, 174 identified as male, 332 identified as female, and five chose
not to say. The average age of the sample was approximately 36 years (SD = 10.9). The majority
of participants identified as White (68.9%) and heterosexual (89.4%). Employment, education
and household income data were also collected. Detailed demographic information is
summarized in Table 1.
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Table 1 Descriptive Statistics of the Sample (N=511)

Mean

SD

35.7

10.9

Female
Male
Transgender/Other

N
332
174
5

%
65%
34%
1%

White
African American/Black
Asian
Puerto Rican/Latino
Mixed
Prefer not to say

352 68.9%
61 11.9%
41 8.1%
19 3.7%
10 2.0%
6
1.2%

Puerto Rican/Latino
Other

19
492

Heterosexual
Gay or Lesbian
Other
Prefer not to say

457 89.4%
20
3.9%
28 5.5%
6
1.2%

Age (years)
Gender

Race

Ethnicity

Sexual Orientation

Education

Employment

Income

Postgraduate Degree
College Graduate
Some College
High School Graduate
Prefer not to say

101
239
137
33
1

3.7%
96.3%

19.8%
46.8%
26.8%
6.5%
0.2%

Employed Full Time
Employed Part Time
Unemployed
Retired
Student
Prefer not to say

350 68.5%
83 16.2%
40
7.8%
8
1.6%
21 4.1%
9
1.8%

< $30,000
$30,000 - $39,999
$40,000 - $49,999
$50,000 - $69,999

85 16.6%
55 10.8%
41 8.0%
114 22.3%
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$70,000 - $99,999
$100,000 - $109,999
$110,000 - $119,999
$120,000 or more

106 20.8%
24 4.7%
13 2.5%
73
20%

Summary Statistics of Measures
Reliability of Scales
Internal consistency was calculated for each subscale within each instrument. Overall,
the instruments used were found to be reliable and consistent with published data. Reliability
data can be found summarized in Table 2.

Table 2: Reliability of Scales
Instrument

Reliability (Cronbach’s Alpha)

Patient Health Questionnaire (PHQ)
Anxiety (BSI)
Depression (BSI)
Smartphone Addiction Scale (SAS)
Messaging Motivations Questionnaire (MMQ)

 = .757
 = .907
 = .917
 = .967
Escape:  = .834
Express:  = .801
Burden:  = .757
Refuge:  = .776
Identifying:  = .681
Processing:  = .790
Communicating:  = .745

Young Adult Attachment to Phone Scale (YAPS)
Mentalized Affectivity Scale (bMAS)

Descriptive statistics were computed for all relevant variables. The dependent variable,
somatizing, ranged from PHQ scores of 0 to 25, with a mean of 7.64 (SD = 5.46). Smartphone
use measures included both objective data, as garnered from participants’ reported screen time
data, and subjective, self-report data garnered from the MMQ, YAPS, and SAS. Reported
screentime had a mean of 22.03 weekly hours (SD = 17.81). Objective screentime reports have
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only recently been possible; as of this writing, this author found only one other scholarly article
that utilized this construct; objective screentime data in the current study is fairly consistent with
the results of that study (Ellis et al, 2019). Means for MMQ escape (2.75, SD = 1.07) and
express (2.95, SD = 1.03), and YAPS burden (2.47, SD = 1.07) and refuge (2.89, SD = 1.09)
were fairly consistent with published norms (Trub & Barbot, 2019). Mean SAS score (93.42, SD
= 34.72) was also fairly consistent with published research using that measure (Kwon et al,
2013). Gaming time, a subjective measure in which participants were asked to approximate the
percentage of time spent playing games, had a mean of 3.00 (SD = 1.98), corresponding to the
range of 21-30%. This sample’s Mentalized Affectivity Scale identifying, processing, and
communicating factors had means of 4.98 (SD = 1.09), 4.96 (SD = 1.25), and 4.00 (SD = 1.28),
respectively. Relevant BSI factors included Depression (1.81, SD = .97) and Anxiety (1.68, SD =
.90). Descriptive statistics are summarized in Table 3.
Table 3: Descriptive Statistics (N=502*)

Mean

Std. Deviation

Skewness

Kurtosis

Smartphone Addiction (SAS)

93.43

34.72

0.16

-0.83

Escape (MMQ)

10.98

4.27

0.19

-0.76

Express (MMQ)

11.80

4.11

-0.03

-0.73

Burden (YAPS)

7.41

3.21

0.47

-0.54

Refuge (YAPS)

8.66

3.28

0.04

-0.92

Weekly Screentime

22.03

17.81

1.13

0.94

Gaming Time

3.00

1.98

1.06

0.43

Somatizing (PHQ)

7.64

5.46

0.76

0.03

Expressing Emotions (bMAS)

4.00

1.28

-0.01

-0.28

Processing Emotions (bMAS)

4.96

1.25

-0.37

-0.44

Identifying Emotions (bMAS)
4.98
1.09
-0.34
0.23
*N=502 and not 511 because 9 participants opted to withhold some demographic data (“prefer not to answer”) and
were not included in analyses.

Correlations between factors were computed to compare with theoretical predictions and are
shown in Table 4.
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Table 4: Correlation Matrix (N=511)

Variable
1. Smartphone Addiction (SAS)

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

-

2. Escape (MMQ)

.621**

-

3. Express (MMQ)

.591**

.652**

-

4. Burden (YAPS)

-0.073

-0.041

-0.019

-

5. Refuge (YAPS)

.693**

.554**

.487**

-.245**

-

6. Weekly Screentime
7. Gaming Time†

.240**

.189**

.256**

-.089*

.186**

0.065

0.034

-0.025

0.094

0.027

-0.073

-

8. Somatizing (PHQ)

.356**

.272**

.337**

.103*

.265**

.135**

.261**

-

9. Expressing (bMAS)

-0.042

-0.057

-.200**

-0.033

-0.027

-0.042

0.007

-.175**

-

10. Processing (bMAS)

-.297**

-.305**

-.331**

-0.004

-.207**

-.141**

-0.002

-.347**

.325**

-

11. Identifying (bMAS)

-0.053

0.001

0.032

-0.042

0.013

0.04

-0.060

-0.007

.277**

.298**

-

12. Age

-.219**

-.237**

-.267**

-.096*

-0.073

-.164**

-.059

-.128**

0.081

.280**

-0.021

-

** Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed).
* Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed).
† N=299 corresponds to participants who play games

Control Variable Selection
Prior to hypothesis testing, a series of t-tests were conducted to examine how
demographic variables were related to somatizing. Gender, income, education, and sexual
orientation were significantly related to somatizing. Specifically, women, individuals with
incomes below 60K, individuals without a college degree, and individuals identifying as nonheterosexual (gay, lesbian, or other) somatized more than men, individuals with incomes above
60K, individuals with a college degree or higher, and individuals identifying as heterosexual. In
addition, there was a significant correlation between respondent age and somatization, r = .13, p < .01. Thus, these variables were included as statistical controls in all analyses. The
results of the t-tests applied are shown in table 5.
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Table 5: t-test analyses
Variable: Somatizing
M

SD

t

p

Gender
Male
Female

6.10
8.48

5.32
5.38

-4.75

.000

Income
< 60k
>= 60k

9.29
6.22

5.95
4.65

6.34

.000

Education
< College degree
>= College degree

8.92
7.01

5.71
5.23

3.67

.000

Sexual Orientation
Heterosexual
Gay/Lesbian/Other

7.41
10.10

5.42
5.46

-3.28

.001

Ethnicity
White
People of Color

7.82
7.36

5.51
5.36

.87

.383

There were also significant differences in somatizing between those who reported a
previous depression diagnosis and those who did not; however, it was decided to use the BSI
depression construct over the binary depression diagnosis response. This decision was made
because responses to the diagnoses questions were highly unusual (36% reported having been
diagnosed with depression) given the National Institute of Mental Health’s reported base rate of
7.1%8. Preliminary analysis showed that somatizing (PHQ) is highly correlated with BSI
measures of depression and anxiety (both approximately 0.7). This relatively high correlation
called into question the statistical distinction between somatizing and depression and anxiety.
Therefore, we ran each regression twice: first with demographic controls only (Model 1),
followed by including BSI depression and BSI anxiety as controls (Model 2). In the cases where

8

https://www.nimh.nih.gov/health/statistics/major-depression.shtml
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a statistically significant result remained after controlling for the BSI factors, we could be more
confident in our deductions about the unique contribution that smartphone use had on
somatizing.

Hypothesis 1 Analysis
Objective Smartphone Usage (Hypothesis 1a)
A regression was conducted to determine whether smartphone use predicted somatizing.
Initially, gender, income, education, sexual orientation, and age were included as controls.
Controlling for these variables, as predicted, there was a significant positive relationship between
weekly hours of smartphone usage and somatizing, b = .03, p = .04. However, when the same
model was rerun controlling for BSI depression and anxiety, the relationship between hours of
smartphone use and somatizing was no longer significant, b = .01, p = .54 (Table 6).
Subjective Smartphone Usage
SAS (Hypothesis 1b). The same process was repeated for subjective indicators of
smartphone usage. When including demographic controls only, SAS scores significantly
positively predicted somatizing, b = .05, p < .001, consistent with predictions. After controlling
for BSI depression and anxiety, the link between SAS score and somatizing was reduced but
remained significant, b = .02, p < .01 (Table 7).
MMQ (Hypothesis 1c). In Model 1, as predicted, express positively predicted
somatizing, b = 1.30, p < .001, but in contrast to predictions, escape did not significantly
correlate with the PHQ, b = .41, p = .13. With the addition of BSI controls in Model 2, the
relationship between express and somatizing was only marginally significant, b = .40, p = .06
(Table 8).
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YAPS (Hypothesis 1d). As predicted, refuge positively predicted somatizing in Model 1,
b = 1.63, p < .001; however, this relationship was reduced to marginal significance in Model 2, b
= .30, p = .06. Unexpectedly, burden also positively predicted somatizing, b = .81, p < .001, in
Model 1, but this relationship was no longer significant in Model 2 (Table 9).
Overall, both objective and subjective indicators of smartphone usage were correlated
with somatizing, with the exception of MMQ escape, when not taking depression and anxiety
into account. Although, opposite to predictions, YAPS burden was positively, rather than
negatively, associated with somatizing. However, only the positive relationship between
smartphone addiction, as measured by SAS, and somatizing survived the inclusion of controls
for depression and anxiety. For other variables, controlling for depression and anxiety reduced
relationships to non-significance (objective smartphone usage, YAPS burden) or marginal
significance (MMQ express and YAPS burden).

Hypothesis 2 Analysis
Regression analyses were conducted to determine whether game playing predicted
somatizing. Consistent with Hypothesis 2, people who reported playing games had higher levels
of somatizing than those who did not, b = 1.84, p < .001, and this relationship remained
significant when accounting for BSI depression and anxiety, b = 1.00, p = .002 (Table 10).
Analyses were also conducted to examine whether the percentage of time spent playing games
correlated with somatizing among the subset of participants who played games. People who
spent more of their time on the phone playing games reported a greater number of somatic
symptoms, b = .73, p < .001, and this relationship held after controlling for anxiety and
depression, b = .30, p < .01 (Table 11).
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Thus, while broad measures of objective and subjective smartphone usage were not
consistently associated with somatizing, measures of whether or not participants played games
on their smartphones and the percentage of time they spent doing so were.
Hypothesis 3 Analysis
In Model 1, all three coefficients for the mentalized affectivity subscales were significant.
In line with predictions, processing (b = -1.23, p < .001) and expressing were negatively
correlated with somatizing (b = -.45, p < .05). Unexpectedly, the relationship between identifying
and somatizing was in the opposite direction (b = .44, p < .05). However, none of these
relationships were significant after controlling for anxiety and depression (p’s > .37; Table 12).
Hypothesis 4 Analysis
Additional analyses were conducted using the PROCESS macro (Hayes, 2013; Model 1)
to examine whether mentalized affectivity (especially the processing component) moderated the
relationship between smartphone use and somatizing. These analyses controlled for the same
variables as before and included interactions between each smartphone use and mentalized
affectivity sub-scale.
Objective Smartphone Usage (Hypothesis 4a)
In a model including demographic controls only, none of the interactions between
objective smartphone usage and the bMAS subscales were significant (Objective Usage x
bMAS-Processing; b = .01, p = .52; Objective Usage x bMAS-Identifying; b = -.01, p = .31;
Objective Usage x bMAS-Expressing; b = -.01, p = .17; Table 13). Thus, Model 2 was not tested,
and moderation was not supported.
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Subjective Smartphone Usage
SAS (Hypothesis 4b). As in the case with objective smart phone usage, interactions
between SAS and the bMAS subscales were not significant (SAS x bMAS-Processing; b = .01, p
= .19; SAS x bMAS-Identifying; b = -.01, p = .38; SAS x bMAS-Expressing; b = .00, p = .99;
Table 14), indicating that the positive relationship between SAS and somatizing does not depend
on mentalized affectivity.
MMQ (Hypothesis 4c). Consistent with Hypothesis 4c, the interaction between MMQ
express and bMAS processing (b = -.52, p < .05) was significant. The interaction between
MMQ escape and bMAS processing (b = .71, p < .01) was also significant but in the opposite
direction from what was predicted. Interactions with the other bMAS sub-scales were not
significant (p’s ≥ .35; Table 15).
A simple slopes analysis revealed that MMQ express and somatization were significantly
positively related for those scoring at the mean (b = .93, p < .01) and below (-1 SD: b = 1.70, p <
.001) of bMAS processing. Specifically, a regions of significance analysis indicated that this
relationship was significant for those scoring 5.63 or lower (see Figure 1). That is, as expected,
preferences for texting as a means of self-expression and somatizing were more closely tied for
individuals who were less adept at processing affective states. However, contrary to predictions,
this relationship was not observed for the other bMAS subscales, and the interaction between
MMQ express and bMAS processing was no longer significant when controlling for anxiety and
depression.
In contrast, the relationship between MMQ escape and somatizing was significant for
those scoring 1 SD or above the mean of bMAS processing (+1 SD: b = 1.18, p < .01),
specifically, those scoring 5.34 and above. In addition, this relationship was significant, and in
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the opposite direction, for individuals scoring about 1.4 SDs below the mean (3.18 and below;
see Figure 2). For individuals high in mentalized affectivity (specifically, processing), texting to
escape was positively associated with somatizing symptoms. For individuals low in the
processing component of mentalized affectivity, texting to escape was associated with fewer
somatizing symptoms. After controlling for depression and anxiety, the interaction remained
significant (b = .41, p < .05), but the relationship between MMQ escape and somatization was
observed only for those scoring at the extremes of bMAS processing (see Figure 3).
YAPS (Hypothesis 4d). In the moderation model for YAPS, only the interaction between
YAPS burden and bMAS identifying was significant (b = -.44, p < .05). In line with the
prediction that the relationship between burden and somatizing would be more stronger for low
mentalizers, it was significantly positive for individuals scoring at the mean (b = .80, p < .001)
and below (-1 SD: b = 1.24, p < .001) of bMAS identifying (specifically, 5.68 and below, see
Figure 4). Individuals scoring at the mean or below of bMAS identifying who reported feeling
burdened by their smartphone use also reported more somatic symptoms. No significant
relationship between burden and somatizing was identified for high mentalizers. However, again,
this relationship was no longer significant when controlling for anxiety and depression, b = -.27,
p = .09. See Table 16 for details.
Casual game playing (Hypothesis 4e). Interactions between both game playing
variables and all bMAS variables were non-significant (see Tables 17 and 18 for details),
suggesting that the relationship between game playing and somatizing does not vary according to
levels of mentalized affectivity.
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Chapter 5: Discussion
This study presented a theoretical case for linking smartphone use, somatizing, and
mentalized affectivity. It made use of psychoanalytic theory, linking the role of language with
affect processing and regulation, and introduced certain smartphone-use tendencies as potentially
disruptive to the way language can bind affect, thereby perpetuating somatizing. It attempted to
test the theory using several variables that tapped into different aspects of smartphone use, and
examined the relationships between smartphone use, mentalized affectivity and somatizing. It
also explored the extent to which mentalized affectivity acted as a moderator between
smartphone use and somatizing.
Initial zero-order bivariate correlations generally supported predictions and lent
descriptive support to the presented theory. Namely, somatizing was positively associated with
all measures of smartphone use, and negatively associated with two factors of mentalized
affectivity. Surprisingly, somatizing was found to be negatively correlated with age, which
foreshadows the discussion regarding the complexity of the construct, and the need for more
clarity and precision in measuring somatizing symptomology.
The regression analyses conveyed a more robust and accurate picture of the data.
Overall, controlling for demographic variables weakened the predicted associations, and
controlling further for BSI depression and anxiety eliminated several significant associations. It
was found that smartphone use was linked with somatizing in some of the ways hypothesized.
I will first discuss hypotheses supported by the data, followed by a general discussion of
those that were not supported, along with theoretical implications and considerations.
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SAS and Somatizing
Hypothesis 1b correctly predicted that smartphone addiction would be positively linked
to somatizing. After controlling for both demographic variables and BSI depression and anxiety,
the correlation remained significant, offering more convincing evidence that smartphone
addiction is uniquely linked with somatizing. This result is consistent with previous research
that has linked smartphone and internet addiction with somatic manifestations of depression (e.g.
Hinic et al, 2010; Cerutti et al, 2019) and somatic symptoms in general (e.g. Boschert, 2013;
Gutierrez et al, 2016; Tavakolizadeh et al, 2014). Several of these studies suggest that poor sleep
quality mediates the relationship between smartphone addiction and detrimental effects on
health, especially in adolescents (Dharmadhikari et al, 2019). This could potentially be
explained by the effect of blue light on circadian rhythms9. Another interesting possibility borne
out of the theory explicated above is the notion that absent preconscious activity, people are
deriving attenuated benefit from sleeping, and are instead opting to be engaged with their
devices. Preconscious functioning in dreaming links affect and thought to language; the
incapacity to openly and fluidly create language that connects to individuals’ difficulties may
interfere with the function of dreaming and by extension, sleep. Per Ogden’s (2009) definition
of dreaming, without the unconscious psychological work one does with one’s emotional
experience during dreaming, perhaps such individuals rely on smartphones to distract
themselves. Ogden links dreaming to object relations in writing “dreaming is the process by
which we attribute personal symbolic meaning to our lived experience and, in this sense, we
dream ourselves and others into existence” (p.28). Clearly, from Ogden’s perspective, dreaming
is associated with processes critical to development of self. To investigate this further, a post-

9 https://www.cdc.gov/niosh/emres/longhourstraining/color.html
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hoc analysis was conducted to determine if item 5 on the SAS (“Feeling tired and lacking
adequate sleep due to excessive smartphone use”) was associated with somatizing. Like the
main analyses, two models were tested. Model 1 included only demographic variables as
controls, and Model 2 included demographic variables and BSI depression and anxiety. Model 1
was found to be significant, b = 1.19, p < .001, and Model 2 was also significant, b = .472, p <
.001, suggesting a connection between smartphone use, sleep, and somatizing. It is also worth
noting that three of the items on the smartphone addiction scale overlap with somatizing, which
may account for some of the association.
MMQ and Somatizing
Hypothesis 1c predicted that MMQ express would predict somatizing. While only
marginally significant after controlling for BSI anxiety and depression, the data supported this
hypothesis. Individuals who rely on texting over richer forms of articulation to facilitate selfexpression tended to somatize more than those who do not use texting in this way. This outcome
is consistent with the theoretical argument presented above. Participants in this study who
reported engaging in texting, a less elaborated and spontaneous form of communication, to
mediate – and subjectively, enhance - their expression also provided information about their
interpersonal desires and anxieties. An examination of the items making up the express
construct (“I feel more confident over text than in person,” “Texting ensures that I express my
thoughts and feelings, which can get lost in conversation,” “I text people things that are
uncomfortable to say in person,” and “I can be funnier in text than in person”) reveals some
such motivations which can be associated with characterological qualities such as narcissistic
longings, issues around power, entitlement and self-esteem, and a tendency to avoid conflict.
Smartphones used in the service of mitigating such conflict can perpetuate rigid, maladaptive
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interpersonal patterns and prevent individuals from living more complete lives. On the other
hand, an argument can be made that prior to smartphones, such individuals might have relegated
themselves to further avoiding interaction, and that smartphones actually facilitate the step
towards increased communication and connection. Those who endorse items defining the
express construct make up individuals living both of these realities – simultaneously even!
However, even if texting can, to some extent, expand the range of and quality of communication,
the process of interacting via text remains more cloaked, scripted, and less object related than
speaking, which is more immediate and replete with communicated emotional content.
Gaming and Somatizing
Game playing predicted somatizing more definitively than objective and subjective
measures of smartphone use. Consistent with hypothesis 2a, in the comparison between the
subset of participants who reported playing games and those who reported no game playing,
those who reported in the affirmative were more likely to somatize. Further, within the gaming
subset, those who reported spending a larger percentage of their time playing games tended to
somatize more. This result was upheld even after controlling for demographics and BSI
depression and anxiety. This result is striking because it defines and distinguishes a subset of the
population who use smartphones in a specific way: Whereas messaging can be understood as an
attempt to reach out to other people, it isn’t the same for gamers. Casual gamers lose contact
with the object: Engaging in casual gaming is an action directed inward, and not object-seeking.
Here it is important to return to the definition of “casual gaming,” contrasting it with other kinds
of gaming – but also to underscore the notion that playing such games can be a symbolic
enactment of conflict in which the player’s activity takes on meaning. However, the somatizing
gamer, as conceptualized above, is hypothesized to engage in game play in a way that is absent
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meaning and devoid of creativity in order to bring about or maintain a tensionless state,
evacuating endogenous stimulation.
In his chapter on game addiction, which he redefines as “compulsive play,” Kriss (2020)
introduces an example of the former type of player, a patient who claims to be “addicted” to the
game Candy Crush Saga, a casual smartphone game. Patiently and sensitively, Kriss describes
how he helps his patient uncover the relational symbolism behind her compulsive play, linking
her compulsion to painful feelings she harbors about herself in relation to her sister. Ultimately,
his patient realizes that she “[plays games she] stops have [hopeless and terrifying] thoughts”
(p.146) and through her work with her therapist, her compulsion transformed into choice. The
difficulty in the current study is illustrated in that individuals like Kriss’ patient, who have the
capacity to symbolize, can share many of the somatizing symptoms that a classic somatizer of
the French school endorses - the latter void of preconscious activity and symbolic representation
– and by statistical results, appear similar. Her sleep was disturbed because of smartphone game
playing, for example, and if she were to fill out a BSI she would have likely endorsed symptoms
consistent with depression and anxiety. However, in reading the narrative of Kriss’ analysis, it is
clear that his patient can free associate in session and that she has a rich fantasy life,
characteristics absent in individuals with reduced preconscious activity. In fact, Kriss identifies
the pivotal moment in his patient’s therapy explicitly as one where her free association links her
game playing to conflicts regarding familial relationships.
With this in mind, the results that emerged in this study linking game playing to
somatizing are exciting, as they support the notion that something important and unique is
happening for gamers, but the mechanisms remain ambiguous; they are not sufficient to make
definitive claims about the underlying processes at play. The data certainly support the theory
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espoused in chapter 1, illustrated in Kriss’ patient, for example, who incorporated compulsive
game playing as a way of countercathecting painful thoughts. However, without a way of
reliably measuring preconscious activity, we cannot make claims about the etiology of
somatizing by distinguishing between the classic somatizer, as described in the French literature,
and the psychoneurotic somatizer.
MMQ, bMAS, and Somatizing
Hypothesis 4c tested the moderation effect of mentalized affectivity on the relationship
between messaging motivations and somatizing. As predicted, processing was the strongest
moderator – indeed, and in contrast to predictions regarding the moderating effect of identifying
and communicating, processing was the only component of mentalized affectivity with a
significant moderation effect before controlling for anxiety and depression. Participants with
limited processing skills who tended to rely on texting to express themselves tended to somatize
more when compared with similar participants with above average processing skills. However,
this relationship was no longer significant when anxiety and depression controls were included in
the analysis.
The moderation result that remained significant after control inclusion involved the
escape construct on the MMQ. This factor measures the extent to which one uses texting to
avoid boredom or flee from undesired internal or external stimuli. Counter to predictions,
individuals who reported high processing scores had a positive, significant relationship between
escape and somatizing. In other words, as participants who reported being able to process their
feelings tended to text to avoid discomfort, they also tended to somatize more. This result
contradicts the prediction that the ability to process or modulate feelings can thwart the
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autonomy and reflexivity of the smartphone-somatizing process by bringing awareness to
underlying feeling states and agency with which one interacts with those feelings. One
explanation of this result could be that escaping leaves some individuals ultimately feeling stuck,
bereft of more active ways of managing uncomfortable internal stimuli. It is also worth
considering cases where the ability to process could be detrimental, as perhaps for individuals in
society who lack the power to change their situation and have no means of proactively
expressing their pain.
Surprisingly, the opposite relationship was observed for escape in people who were low
processors. Escape, comprised of items “I feel the impulse to check or send messages during
meetings and/or class,” “When I’m bored, I text,” “I text whenever I’m waiting for someone or
something to happen,” and “When I’m in a situation I want to distract myself from, I text,”
describes behaviors associated with reactions to unpleasant affect. The basis for hypotheses 1c
and 4c was the idea that the more messaging is used as a way to sidestep affect, the more
somatizing would be observed. In the analysis of moderation, hypothesis 4c predicted that
reliance on smartphones to avoid feelings would be buffered by the inherent capacity to know
and work with feelings. These predictions, however did not take into account an important
difference between the express and escape factors. In the case of express, the messaging action
is precisely that: A message, whose content is the point, albeit in altered or augmented form
from its initial state within the subject. In the case of escape, the possibility is that the messaging
behavior has a different purpose – reaching out to another person to alleviate discomfort,
relegating the message content to a secondary position. In using messaging to escape,
individuals enact reaching-out behaviors, which can be interpreted as more related and
interpersonally connected, which, while not the same as chatting in person, requires trust. With
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this interpretation of the construct, escape is not simply arbitrary evacuation of mentation. A
Winnicottian interpretation suggests that individuals high in express engage in object relatedness
(or even, the “epithet,” object communication (1971)) while those texting to escape have
graduated to some degree of object use. Examining the results with this understanding can help
to explain why only express was linked with somatizing (and not escape) in the analysis of
MMQ variables and somatizing, and the observed opposite moderation trend in the escape
analysis. Individuals high in processing had a significant positive association between escape
and somatizing. Those low in processing had a significant negative association between escape
and somatizing. This suggests that high processors and low processors may be deriving different
things from texting. For low mentalizers, reaching out to another via text may in some way
actually be constructively compensating for the processing deficit in a way that is healing,
whereas for high mentalizers, texting may be more purely for distraction, given their inherent
ability to process affect. Perhaps somatizers who score higher in processing tend to ruminate
more in efforts to control emotion and ultimately feel stuck, which catalyzes messaging as an
attempt to disrupt the pattern.
Identifying, processing, and communicating as constructs were generated with
psychological and philosophical considerations, creativity, and intuition. They also emerged as
factors in subsequent statistical analyses, comprising a scale with excellent psychometric
properties. Still, as explained in chapter 1, Jurist (2018) makes it clear that the boundaries
between these constructs are fuzzy. It is therefore especially exciting to see that it is, in fact,
processing that plays a moderating role above the other factors, since this result is most
consistent with theory – even if rendered insignificant with the addition of controls in the
analysis of express. Prior to including anxiety and depression as controls (Model 1) the factors
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of mentalized affectivity were found to be linked with somatizing in ways predicted for
processing and expressing, and in the opposite direction for identifying. Individuals with higher
capacities to identify feelings tended to somatize more. This result suggests a real distinction
between the processing and communicating functions operating to the extent that is necessary in
order to identify a feeling, and processing and communicating serving unique functions beyond
identifying. Interestingly, the factors of mentalized affectivity were found not to be directly
related to somatizing (hypothesis 3) after controls were added. The effects of including anxiety
and depression as controls will be discussed below.
Depression, Anxiety, and Somatizing
The inclusion of anxiety and depression as controls rendered many results insignificant.
Much has been written (e.g. Wijeratne & Hickie, 2001; Baughman III, 1994; Nakao et al, 2001)
on the correlation between depression, anxiety, and somatizing and ways that depression and
anxiety can manifest somatically (e.g. Zwaigenbaum et al, 1999; De Waal Margot et al, 2004).
In at least one other study, a similar disappearance of significance was observed when
controlling for depression and anxiety (Montoro et al, 2016). In the present study, the high
correlations linking anxiety, depression and somatizing may have obscured the unique effect of
smartphone use. With this in mind, it is worth considering the extent to which these concepts are
distinguishable from each other. In exploring the relationship between smartphone use and
somatizing, are we implicitly asking about how smartphone use is related to depression and
anxiety with somatizing being one, but not the only way these are manifest?
Lowe and his colleagues (2008) found that 50% of a clinical sample had comorbid
depression, anxiety and somatization. Further, they found that the contribution of their overlap
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to impairment exceeded the contribution of their independent parts to the extent that they
suggested the development of an overarching diagnostic category for the three ailments, with
subclassification descriptors. Similarly, in their study, De Waal Margot and colleagues (2004)
suggested several explanations for the high comorbidity of anxiety, depression, and somatizing,
including the possibilities of each causing the other, or even circular causality. Both studies,
however, maintain that there are unique contributions from each of depression, anxiety, and
somatization that have detrimental effects on patient functioning, and there exist many cases of
pure, non-comorbid, somatizing. Therefore, despite frequent comorbidity, somatization should
maintain the designation of its own diagnostic category.
Depressive inventories, such as the BSI used in this study, are sensitive to specific
symptoms of depression, which can manifest somatically. However, they measure a different
condition than the blankness associated with the psychosomatic patient described above. Green
(2010) describes a blank state, one where symbolization and repression has not taken place. This
narcissistic, vacant state is one in which investments are not connected to the object world. This
“primary depression” differs from the secondary depression experienced by those functioning in
the psychoneurotic register, and is a state of “radical decathexis on the part of the patient who
seeks to attain a state of emptiness and aspires to non-being and nothingness” (Green, 2005, p.
39). Paiva (2018) similarly describes this depression as a phenomenon in which “operations
support the illusion of setting the psychic apparatus free from the conflicts that it cannot solve,
but which, concomitantly, empty the psychic device, making it exhausted” (p. 4).
Without distinguishing between the somatizing associated with psychoneurotic
depression and the empty, non-neurotic depression, the underlying mechanism remains opaque.
Had this study been comprised smartphone users who operated on a non-neurotic level of
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functioning, it is likely we would have seen more convincing results. A subject for future
research would be the development of an instrument capable of measuring “primary” depression,
or, alternatively, a measure of preconscious activity. This is a tall order, as Green (1996) aptly
notes:

If we try to do some research according to scientific methodology, that is, most of the
time, with its need of statistical evidence, it is obvious that we shall not be able either to
observe, or to label or to classify all that comes under our scrutiny from the couch as
parts or expressions of sexuality and destructiveness. We shall only be able to consider
the visible part of the iceberg.

Studies like this could be strengthened however, if conducted in a setting where
diagnoses could be recorded more reliably and accurately. We relied on BSI anxiety and
depression self-report instruments to use as controls. Although valid, the gold standard for
assessing such ailments is a clinical interview. Generally speaking, with the exception of
objective smartphone-use measures, we relied on self-report instruments, which can be
disadvantageous as participants’ responses can be biased. With regards to collecting objective
screentime data, it remained difficult to parse apart and categorize individuals’ smartphone use.
While we could collect data like average daily time used, average number of daily pickups, and
lists of apps used, we realized that this information gave us limited insight about the state
participants were in when they chose to use their smartphones, and how they tended to use
individual apps.
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Clinical Implications
For somatizers who do not free associate and are incapable of or have limited capacity to
symbolize, the therapist may want to abandon the attempt at analytic neutrality, since work in the
transference is inherently stymied. With such patients, self and other have not yet been
“dreamed” into existence, rendering the therapist and treatment void of transferential traction. In
the service of helping patients develop the capacity to dream and expand preconscious
functioning, clinicians may want to adopt a more conversation style, offering patients a glimpse
into the creative, associative process borne of preconscious activity. Together, in a good-enough
environment, the therapist can sensitively oversee the cultivation of a novel, therapist-patient
culture, replete with experiences encoded in the language of shared metaphors.
For somatizers who have some capacity to symbolize who present with more
psychoneurotic dynamics, the therapist may expand the capabilities of the symbolic system by
drawing on and enhancing existing metaphors from the patient’s life. This could be especially
useful for network gamers who enjoy first person player games in which there is a general
narrative and where there is freedom to create one’s own avatar, for example. Therapists may
join such patients in their narratives and work within the metaphors of their games to help to
augment patients’ existing strengths. Clinical exploration of game choice, character attachments,
narrative preferences, and other facets of game play may be harnessed to help discover insights
about motivations for gaming choices, and may ultimately be applied more generally to facilitate
higher levels of intra- and interpersonal functioning beyond the digital sphere.

75

SMARTPHONES AND SOMATIZING – J. BERKOWITZ
Future Directions
An important conclusion affirmed in this study is that somatizing is more complicated
than we generally think. Just as enactments can occur at different levels, ranging from simple
extrusion of thought to more complicated action approximating verbalization, somatizing can
exist over a broad characterological range, with similar symptoms serving varying purposes.
Future research could work to find ways of parsing somatizing occurring at different levels. To
gain clarity, it may be helpful to explore the link between somatizing and object relations using
scales such as the object-relations inventory, and perhaps even use projective tests and implicit
association tests to establish a connection between somatizing and unconscious processes. The
relationship between complex behaviors associated with messaging motivations (MMQ) and
mentalized affectivity, for example, could also be explored qualitatively in a way that could
provide more depth and understanding than with the quantitative, statistical methods utilized in
this study.
Similarly, smartphones have many facets, and can be utilized in complicated ways, where
similar ways of engagement can have different underlying motivations. Future research on
smartphone use could benefit from attempting to link smartphone usage more directly to affect
by asking participants to provide real-time affect data as they use their phones. This could
require the development of unique apps that “check in” with participants periodically so that
researchers could track smartphone use and affect correlates with time.
Another way to get a more complete understanding of the function that smartphones
serve for people could be in investigating individuals’ behaviors before they had smartphones:
For example, did they tend to avoid more? Were they more brave? The quality with and extent

76

SMARTPHONES AND SOMATIZING – J. BERKOWITZ
to which individuals choose to use smartphones to connect with or avoid others could be
clarified by investigating their pre-smartphone tendencies.
Given the observed interaction between smartphone use, sleep, and somatizing, a
potentially interesting extension to this study could involve an exploration of the relationship
between smartphone use and dreaming. If for some individuals smartphone use has the role of
defending against unconscious conflict, it is not such a leap to suggest that determinants of such
defensive processes could be observed in such study. More specifically, one could analyze
smartphone use and dreaming in groups comprised of individuals who self-identify as “good
sleepers” and those who tend to keep themselves awake on their smartphones instead. The
difficulty here is the operationalization of the “dreaming” construct, combined with trying to find
a way to measure processes that are otherwise unconscious. Additionally, it would be important
to investigate the stage of sleep that is interrupted: REM sleep specifically, for example, has
been associated with dreaming and symbolizing (Ellman, 1992).
Clearly for some, gaming serves an integral function. Gaming can potentially express
conflict, extrude painful symbolized thoughts, or can even be used to soothe or avoid thought
entirely. With more research, therapists can explore the idea of game-play as an adjunctive,
facilitating component to be used with established therapeutic modalities.
Conclusion
The case presented in this study is not that smartphones are inherently problematic:
Rather, when considered clinically, these results suggests that engaging with smartphones should
be done with care and intention, striving for awareness of how the mediating device affects the
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process of interaction, vacillating between enhancing and suppressing interpersonal openness
and growth.
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Table 6: Weekly Screentime vs. Somatizing
Regression models for Hypothesis 1a
Variable

b

β

t

Model 1
Income (1 = 60k or higher)

-2.51

-0.23

-5.28***

Education (1 = college degree or higher)

-0.65

-0.06

-1.28

Gender (1 = Female)

2.13

0.19

4.40***

Sexual Orientation (1 = Gay, Lesbian, other)

2.00

0.10

2.48*

Age

-0.05

-0.09

-2.18*

Total weekly hours of smartphone use

0.03

0.09

2.05*

Model 2
Income (1 = 60k or higher)

-0.66

-0.06

-1.93†

Education (1 = college degree or higher)

-0.49

-0.04

-1.37

Gender (1 = Female)

1.66

0.14

4.86***

Sexual Orientation (1 = Gay, Lesbian, other)

0.95

0.05

1.67

Age

0.02

0.04

1.14

Total weekly hours of smartphone use

0.01

0.02

0.61

Anxiety

2.19

0.36

7.33***

Depression

2.19

0.39

7.84***

† p ≤ 0.10, *p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, ***p < 0.001
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R2

df

F

.15

6, 495

14.58***

.58

8, 493

85.44***

SMARTPHONES AND SOMATIZING – J. BERKOWITZ

Table 7: SAS vs. Somatizing
Regression models for Hypothesis 1b
Variable

b

β

t

Model 1
Income (1 = 60k or higher)

-2.23

-0.20

-4.96***

Education (1 = college degree or higher)

-0.40

-0.03

-0.84

Gender (1 = Female)

2.27

0.20

4.96***

Sexual Orientation (1 = Gay, Lesbian, other)

2.07

0.11

2.72**

Age

-0.02

-0.04

-0.96

Smartphone Addiction (SAS)

0.05

0.32

7.95***

Model 2
Income (1 = 60k or higher)

-0.66

-0.06

-1.95†

Education (1 = college degree or higher)

-0.41

-0.04

-1.20

Gender (1 = Female)

1.73

0.15

5.10***

Sexual Orientation (1 = Gay, Lesbian, other)

1.02

0.05

1.81†

Age

0.02

0.05

1.53

Smartphone Addiction (SAS)

0.02

0.10

3.17**

Anxiety

2.05

0.34

6.86***

Depression

2.12

0.37

7.64***

† p ≤ 0.10, *p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, ***p < 0.001
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R2

df

F

.24

6, 495

26.06***

.59

8, 493

88.33***
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Table 8: MMQ vs. Somatizing
Regression models for Hypothesis 1c
Variable

b

β

t

Model 1
Income (1 = 60k or higher)

-2.39

-0.22

-5.26***

Education (1 = college degree or higher)

-0.51

-0.04

-1.05

Gender (1 = Female)

1.82

0.16

3.92***

Sexual Orientation (1 = Gay, Lesbian, other)

2.06

0.11

2.67**

Age

-0.01

-0.02

-0.55

MMQ-Express

1.30

0.24

4.56***

MMQ-Escape

0.41

0.08

1.52

Model 2
Income (1 = 60k or higher)

-0.69

-0.06

-2.03*

Education (1 = college degree or higher)

-0.45

-0.04

-1.27

Gender (1 = Female)

1.58

0.14

4.65***

Sexual Orientation (1 = Gay, Lesbian, other)

1.01

0.05

1.77†

Age

0.03

0.05

1.67

MMQ-Express

0.40

0.08

1.88†

MMQ-Escape

0.10

0.02

0.52

Anxiety

2.17

0.36

7.31***

Depression

2.04

0.36

7.22***

† p ≤ 0.10, *p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, ***p < 0.001
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R2

df

F

.22

7, 494

20.39***

.59

9, 492

77.71***
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Table 9: YAPS vs. Somatizing
Regression models for Hypothesis 1d
Variable

b

β

t

Model 1
Income (1 = 60k or higher)

-2.39

-0.22

-5.25***

Education (1 = college degree or higher)

-0.63

-0.05

-1.30

Gender (1 = Female)

1.97

0.17

4.22***

Sexual Orientation (1 = Gay, Lesbian, other)

2.13

0.11

2.75**

Age

-0.04

-0.07

-1.72†

YAPS-Refuge

1.36

0.27

6.53***

YAPS-Burden

0.81

0.16

3.77***

Model 2
Income (1 = 60k or higher)

-0.70

-0.06

-2.03*

Education (1 = college degree or higher)

-0.46

-0.04

-1.31

Gender (1 = Female)

1.61

0.14

4.72***

Sexual Orientation (1 = Gay, Lesbian, other)

1.02

0.05

1.80†

Age

0.02

0.03

1.13

YAPS-Refuge

0.30

0.06

1.87†

YAPS-Burden

0.04

0.01

0.24

Anxiety

2.10

0.35

6.83***

Depression

2.17

0.38

7.82***

† p ≤ 0.10, *p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, ***p < 0.001
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R2

df

F

.22

7, 494

19.77***

.58

9, 492

76.65***
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Table 10: Game playing vs. Somatizing
Regression models for Hypothesis 2a
Variable

b

β

t

Model 1
Income (1 = 60k or higher)

-2.52

-0.23

-5.38***

Education (1 = college degree or higher)

-0.64

-0.06

-1.28

Gender (1 = Female)

2.05

0.18

4.29***

Sexual Orientation (1 = Gay, Lesbian, other)

1.96

0.10

2.47*

Age

-0.06

-0.12

-2.78**

Game playing (1 = plays games)

1.84

0.17

4.03***

Model 2
Income (1 = 60k or higher)

-0.67

-0.06

-1.98†

Education (1 = college degree or higher)

-0.47

-0.04

-1.34

Gender (1 = Female)

1.62

0.14

4.78***

Sexual Orientation (1 = Gay, Lesbian, other)

0.94

0.05

1.66

Age

0.01

0.02

0.83

Game playing (1 = plays games)

1.00

0.09

3.09**

Anxiety

2.14

0.35

7.24***

Depression

2.17

0.38

7.88***

† p ≤ 0.10, *p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, ***p < 0.001
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R2

df

F

.17

6, 495

16.92***

.59

8, 493

88.17***
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Table 11: Percent of Time Gaming vs. Somatizing
Regression models for Hypothesis 2b
Variable

b

β

T

Model 1
Income (1 = 60k or higher)

-2.91

-0.26

-4.76***

Education (1 = college degree or higher)

-0.54

-0.05

-0.84

Gender (1 = Female)

1.45

0.12

2.24*

Sexual Orientation (1 = Gay, Lesbian, other)

2.30

0.12

2.23*

Age

-0.06

-0.12

2.25*

Percent of time spent playing games

0.73

0.26

4.92***

Model 2
Income (1 = 60k or higher)

-0.74

-0.07

-1.59

Education (1 = college degree or higher)

-0.72

-0.06

-1.54

Gender (1 = Female)

1.28

0.11

2.73**

Sexual Orientation (1 = Gay, Lesbian, other)

0.69

0.04

0.92

Age

0.00

0.01

0.20

Percent of time spent playing games

0.30

0.11

2.68**

Anxiety

1.87

0.32

4.69***

Depression

2.24

0.40

5.92***

† p ≤ 0.10, *p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, ***p < 0.001
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R2

df

F

.21

6, 287

12.70***

.59

8, 285

50.99***
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Table 12: bMAS vs. Somatizing
Regression models for Hypothesis 3
Variable

b

β

t

Model 1
Income (1 = 60k or higher)

-2.43

-0.22

-5.35***

Education (1 = college degree or higher)

-0.51

-0.04

-1.06

Gender (1 = Female)

1.70

0.15

3.59***

Sexual Orientation (1 = Gay, Lesbian, other)

1.50

0.08

1.94†

Age

-0.01

-0.02

-0.46

bMAS-Identifying

0.44

0.09

2.03*

bMAS-Processing

-1.23

-0.28

-6.06***

bMAS-Expressing

-0.45

-0.10

-2.44*

Model 2
Income (1 = 60k or higher)

-0.67

-0.06

-1.95†

Education (1 = college degree or higher)

-0.48

-0.04

-1.36

Gender (1 = Female)

1.61

0.14

4.60***

Sexual Orientation (1 = Gay, Lesbian, other)

0.92

0.05

1.61

Age

0.02

0.03

1.06

bMAS-Identifying

0.15

0.03

0.89

bMAS-Processing

0.01

0.00

0.06

MAS-Expressing

0.06

0.02

0.45

Anxiety

2.20

0.36

7.31***

Depression

2.23

0.39

7.46***

† p ≤ 0.10, *p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, ***p < 0.001
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R2

df

F

.23

8, 493

18.13***

.58

10, 491

68.34***
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Table 13: bMAS and Screentime vs. Somatizing
Regression model for Hypothesis 4a
Variable

b

t

Model 1
Income (1 = 60k or higher)

-2.37

-5.22***

Education (1 = college degree or higher)

-0.55

-1.14

Gender (1 = Female)

1.70

3.58***

Sexual Orientation (1 = Gay, Lesbian, other)

1.54

2.00*

Age

-0.01

-0.24

Objective smartphone use

0.02

1.81†

bMAS-Identifying

0.74

2.09*

bMAS-Processing

-1.35

-4.33***

bMAS-Expressing

-0.10

-0.36

Objective use * bMAS-Identifying

-0.01

-1.02

Objective use * bMAS-Processing

0.01

0.64

Objective use * bMAS-Expressing

-0.01

-1.39

† p ≤ 0.10, *p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, ***p < 0.001
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R2

df

F

.24

12, 489

12.70***
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Table 14: bMAS and SAS vs. Somatizing
Regression model for Hypothesis 4b
Variable

B

t

Model 1
Income (1 = 60k or higher)

-2.17

-4.98***

Education (1 = college degree or higher)

-0.33

-0.70

Gender (1 = Female)

1.95

4.28***

Sexual Orientation (1= Gay, Lesbian, other)

1.65

2.22*

Age

0.01

0.62

SAS

0.04

6.83***

bMAS-Identifying

0.38

1.76†

bMAS-Processing

-0.89

-4.45***

bMAS-Expressing

-0.52

-2.89**

SAS * bMAS-Identifying

-0.01

-0.88

SAS * bMAS-Processing

0.01

1.32

SAS * bMAS-Expressing

0.00

0.04

† p ≤ 0.10, *p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, ***p < 0.001
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R2

df

F

.30

12, 489

17.29***
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Table 15: MMQ and bMAS vs. Somatizing
Regression models for Hypothesis 4c
Variable

b

t

Model 1
Income (1 = 60k or higher)

-2.33

-5.27***

Education (1 = college degree or higher)

-0.48

-1.02

Gender (1 = Female)

1.58

3.42***

Sexual Orientation (1 = Gay, Lesbian, other)

1.70

2.25*

Age

0.01

0.56

MMQ-Express

0.98

15.48***

MMQ-Escape

0.27

1.03

MAS-Identifying

0.25

-1.15

MAS-Processing

-0.96

-4.60***

MAS-Expressing

-0.39

-2.12*

MMQ-Express * MAS-Identifying

-0.04

-0.18

MMQ-Express * MAS-Processing

-0.52

2.20*

MMQ-Express * MAS-Expressing

-0.20

-0.94

MMQ-Escape * MAS-Identifying

-0.23

-0.94

MMQ-Escape * MAS-Processing

0.71

3.05**

MMQ-Escape * MAS-Expressing

0.15

0.78

Model 2
Income (1 = 60k or higher)

-0.70

-2.04*

Education (1 = college degree or higher)

-0.48

-1.35

Gender (1 = Female)

1.59

4.57***

Sexual Orientation (Gay, Lesbian, other)

0.94

1.65

Age

0.02

1.55

MMQ-Express

0.45

2.07*

MMQ-Escape

0.05

0.24

bMAS-Identifying

0.10

0.60
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R2

df

F

.29

16, 485

12.27***

.60

18, 483

40.02***
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bMAS-Processing

0.07

0.44

bMAS-Expressing

0.07

0.46

MMQ-Express * bMAS-Identifying

-0.16

-0.87

MMQ-Express * bMAS-Processing

-0.27

-1.52

MMQ-Express * bMAS-Expressing

-0.02

-0.11

MMQ-Escape * bMAS-Identifying

0.13

0.69

MMQ-Escape * bMAS-Processing

0.41

2.34*

MMQ-Escape * bMAS-Expressing

0.17

1.20

Anxiety

2.14

7.11***

Depression

2.16

7.21***

† p ≤ 0.10, *p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, ***p < 0.001
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Table 16: YAPS and bMAS vs. Somatizing
Regression models for Hypothesis 4d
Variable

b

t

Model 1
Income (1 = 60k or higher)

-2.35

-5.31***

Education (1 = college degree or higher)

-0.51

-1.09

Gender (1 = Female)

1.67

3.65***

Sexual Orientation (Gay, Lesbian, other)

1.70

2.25*

Age

0.01

0.28

YAPS-Refuge

1.10

5.30***

YAPS-Burden

0.81

3.86***

bMAS-Identifying

0.39

1.82†

bMAS-Processing

-1.02

-5.10***

bMAS-Expressing

-0.53

-2.93**

YAPS-Refuge * bMAS-Identifying

0.00

0.00

YAPS-Refuge * bMAS-Processing

0.04

0.26

YAPS-Refuge * bMAS-Expressing

-0.06

-0.33

YAPS-Burden * bMAS-Identifying

-0.44

-2.11*

YAPS-Burden * bMAS-Processing

-0.10

-0.55

YAPS-Burden * bMAS-Expressing

-0.01

-0.07

Model 2
Income (1 = 60k or higher)

-0.75

-2.15*

Education (1 = college degree or higher)

-0.46

-1.28

Gender (1 = Female)

1.60

4.53***

Sexual Orientation (Gay, Lesbian, other)

0.99

1.71†

Age

0.02

1.27

YAPS-Refuge

0.28

1.70†

YAPS-Burden

0.06

0.35

bMAS-Identifying

0.12

0.73
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df

F

.29

16, 485

12.55***

.59

18, 483

38.48***
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bMAS-Processing

0.04

0.25

bMAS-Expressing

0.01

0.07

YAPS-Refuge * bMAS-Identifying

0.07

0.46

YAPS-Refuge * bMAS-Processing

0.06

0.45

YAPS-Refuge * bMAS-Expressing

-0.03

0.23

YAPS-Burden * bMAS-Identifying

-0.27

-1.71†

YAPS-Burden * bMAS-Processing

0.03

0.20

YAPS-Burden * bMAS-Expressing

-0.01

-0.10

Anxiety

2.19

7.29***

Depression

2.12

6.82***

† p ≤ 0.10, *p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, ***p < 0.001
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Table 17: Game playing and bMAS vs. Somatizing
Regression models for Hypothesis 4e (dichotomous variable)
Variable
b
t
Model 1
Income (1 = 60k or higher)

-2.38

-5.30***

Education (1 = college degree or higher)

-0.47

-0.97

Gender (1 = Female)

1.63

3.46***

Sexual Orientation (1= Gay, Lesbian, other)

1.48

1.94†

Age

-0.01

-0.77

Game playing (1 = plays games)

1.59

3.63***

bMAS-Identifying

0.50

1.47

bMAS-Processing

-1.24

-3.96***

bMAS-Expressing

-0.57

-2.02*

Game playing * bMAS-Identifying

-0.11

-0.26

Game playing * bMAS-Processing

0.11

0.29

Game playing * bMAS-Expressing

0.20

0.54

† p ≤ 0.10, *p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, ***p < 0.001
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R2

df

F

.25

12, 489

13.47***
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Table 18: Percent of time Game Playing and bMAS vs. Somatizing
Regression model for Hypothesis 4e (continuous variable)
Variable
b
t
Model 1
Income (1 = 60k or higher)

-2.87

-4.85***

Education (1 = college degree or higher)

-0.25

-0.39

Gender (1 = Female)

1.04

1.63

Sexual Orientation (1= Gay, Lesbian, other)

1.60

1.59

Age

-0.02

-0.60

Percent of time spent playing games

0.72

4.96***

bMAS-Identifying

0.57

1.91†

bMAS-Processing

-1.19

-4.40***

bMAS-Expressing

-0.39

-1.59**

Time playing games * bMAS-Identifying

-0.08

-0.61

Time playing games * bMAS-Processing

0.08

0.64

Time playing games * bMAS-Expressing

-0.11

-0.86

† p ≤ 0.10, *p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, ***p < 0.001
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R2

df

F

.28

12, 281

9.18***
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Figure 1. Relationship between MMQ-Express and PHQ by levels of bMAS-Processing without
adjusting for BSI Depression and Anxiety. Relationships are significant on the left of the dotted
line. Negative y-axis values indicate a negative correlation; positive y-axis values indicate a
positive correlation.
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Figure 2. Relationship between MMQ-Escape and PHQ by levels of bMAS-Processing without
adjusting for BSI Depression and Anxiety. Relationships are significant outside of the dotted
lines and not significant in the space between the two lines. Negative y-axis values indicate a
negative correlation; positive y-axis values indicate a positive correlation.
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Figure 3. Relationship between MMQ-Escape and PHQ by levels of bMAS-Processing after
adjusting for BSI Depression and Anxiety. Relationships are significant outside of the dotted
lines and not significant in the space between the two lines. Negative y-axis values indicate a
negative correlation; positive y-axis values indicate a positive correlation.
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Figure 4. Relationship between YAPS-Burden and PHQ by levels of bMAS-Identifying without
adjusting for BSI Depression and Anxiety. Relationships are significant on the left of the dotted
line. Negative y-axis values indicate a negative correlation; positive y-axis values indicate a
positive correlation.
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Appendix A: Measures

Brief Mentalized Affectivity Scale (B-MAS)
Here are a number of statements about emotions that may or may not apply to you. Please
indicate the extent to which you agree or disagree with each statement using the scale below .

Disagree
strongly

Disagree
Moderately

Disagree a
little

Neither agree
nor disagree

Agree a
little

Agree
moderately

Agree
strongly

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

1.____ I try to put effort into identifying my emotions.
2.____ When I am filled with a negative emotion, I know how to handle it.
3.____ People tell me I am good at expressing my emotions.
4.____ I often look back at my life history to help inform my current emotional state and
situation.
5.____ It is hard for me to manage my emotions.
6.____ If I feel something, I prefer not to discuss it with others.
7.____ I try to understand the complexity of my emotions.
8.____ I am good at controlling my emotions.
9.____ If I feel something, I will convey it to others.
10.____ I rarely think about the reasons behind why I am feeling a certain way.
11.____ I am good at distinguishing between different emotions that I feel.
12.____ I often keep my emotions inside.
______________________________________________________________________________
B-MAS scoring (“R” denotes reverse-scored items): Identifying: 1, 4, 7, 10R; Processing: 2, 5R,
8, 11; Expressing: 3, 6R, 9, 12R.
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Smartphone Addiction Scale (SAS)
(Strongly Disagree (1) to Strongly Agree (6))
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Young Adult Attachment to Phone Scale (YAPS)

Please answer the following questions using the following 5-point Likert scale.
1
2
3
does not describe describes me describes me
me at all
a little
somewhat

4
5
describes me describes me
well
perfectly

I feel anxious or uncomfortable when I can’t check my phone.
1

2

3

4

5

4

5

4

5

Being without my phone gives me a sense of relief.
1

2

3

Having my phone makes me feel safer.
1

2

3

I intentionally put my phone out of reach to enjoy an activity I’m engaged in.
1

2

3

4

5

3

4

5

4

5

I feel naked without my phone.
1

2

I feel better when I don’t have my phone on me.
1

2

3

101

SMARTPHONES AND SOMATIZING – J. BERKOWITZ

Messaging Motivations Questionnaire (MMQ)
Please answer the following questions using the following 5-point Likert scale.
1
never or almost
never

2
rarely

3
sometimes

4
often

5
always or almost
always

4

5

I feel more confident over text than in person.
1

2

3

I feel the impulse to check or send messages during meetings and/or class.
1

2

3

4

5

Texting ensures that I express my thoughts and feelings, which can get lost in conversation.
1

2

3

4

5

3

4

5

When I’m bored, I text.
1

2

I text people things that are uncomfortable to say in person.
1

2

3

4

5

I text whenever I'm waiting for someone or something to happen.
1

2

3

4

5

4

5

I can be funnier over text than in person.
1

2

3

When I'm in a situation I want to distract myself from, I text.
1

2

3

4
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